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Introduction
This thesis contains several lines of research conducted during my four years at the European
University Institute. It consists of three chapters that analyze the link between parental
inter-vivos transfers, education and inequality.
In the first chapter, ”Accounting for the Changing Role of Family Income in Determining
College Entry”, I present a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations and incomplete markets and I use this model to measure the fraction of households
constrained in their college entry decision. College education is financed by family transfers
and public subsidies, where transfers are generated through altruism on part of the parents.
Parents face a trade-off between making transfers to their children and own savings. Ceteris
paribus, parents who expect lower future earnings transfer less and save more. Data from the
1986 Survey of Consumer Finances give support to this mechanism. I show that this trade-off
leads to substantially higher estimates of the fraction of constrained households compared to
the results in the empirical literature (18 instead of 8 percent). The model also predicts that
an increment in parents’ earnings uncertainty decreases their willingness to provide transfers.
In combination with rising returns to education, which makes college going more attractive,
this boosts the number of constrained youths and explains why family income has become
more important for college access over the last decades in the U.S. economy.
In chapter two, titled ”Why Do the Rich Save More: The Role of Housing”, I analyze the
determinants of the wealth-income gradient with educational attainment that is observable
in the data. This gradient is very steep: using the 1989 wave of the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), I find the median college graduate near retirement age holds twice as much
wealth as the median high school dropout. In this paper, I argue that housing plays an
important role for explaining the wealth-income gradient that is observable in the data.
In order to shed more light on the role of housing, I set up a computable life cycle model.
Markets are incomplete, and household face idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Households receive
utility from the consumption of housing services and non-housing consumption. In total,
housing serves as a consumption good, asset and collateral for financial loans.
I show that a version of this model that is calibrated to match key features of the U.S.
economy can generate a wealth-income gap between the median of two education groups,
namely college graduates and high school dropouts, that is observable in the 1989 SCF.
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Housing accounts for a substantial fraction of the observable wealth-income gap between the
two education groups: I find that a share of 25 percent of the total gap is due to the presence
of housing in the model. Strikingly, introducing housing raises the retirement savings of the
median college graduates.
The last chapter, ”Parental Transfers and Parental Income: Does the Future Matter More
Than the Present?” adds to the results that were derived in the first chapter. More precisely,
I present a model of parental transfers that is based on the assumption of one sided altruism.
I use this model to analytically study the link between parental expectations about their
future resources and their present transfer behavior. In the context of my model, I show that
parents with brighter earnings prospects are willing to transfer more to their offspring already
today, all other things equal.
I use data from the 1983 and the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to analyze
whether these theoretical predictions receive empirical support. In line with the theoretical
predictions, I find that better educated households transfer more to their children, for a given
level of their income and wealth. If better educated households have higher mean earnings
profile and lower uncertainty about their earnings as suggested by the empirical literature,
this suggests that households with better earnings prospects do indeed transfer more to their
kids.
The chapter also makes an important contribution to the question whether borrowing
constraints for education are quantitatively important in determining access to college. Using
data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSY), I find that parental
education has a significant impact on college enrolment, even after controlling for measures
of pre-college ability such as AFQT-scores. According to my theoretical results, this suggests
that parental resources have strong impact on their children’s college decision, even if college
enrolment gaps with respect to current income are small. Thus, the true fraction of the
population that is adversely affected in their college decision by market imperfections may be
much higher than the small impact of current income suggests.
4
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Chapters
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Chapter 1
Accounting for the Changing Role
of Family Income in Determining
College Entry
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1.1 Introduction
In the United States, the wage premium of college graduates relative to high school graduates
increased by around 30 percent between 1980 and 2000 (Katz and Autor (1999)). This
period was also characterized by a dramatic rise of college tuition fees and an amplification
of the within-group earnings inequality. College participation rates stagnated, while the
enrolment gaps between students from different family income groups widened (Ellwood and
Kane (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Kane (2006)).
This suggests that financial constraints prevent a larger share of low-income households
from sending their children to college, leading to a sluggish adjustment of college participation
despite the surge in the college premium (Kane (2006)). Whether this is true or not is subject
to an ongoing debate in the empirical literature. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro
and Heckman (2003) argue that short-term cash constraints around college age are binding
only for a small fraction of households. They find that long-term factors (family background
variables) which affect pre-college education can account for the main part of enrolment gaps
by income. However, it is not clear to what extend long-term factors can account for the
widening of the enrolment gaps observed over time. Belley and Lochner (2007) document
that the impact of family income on college attendance rates increased dramatically between
1980 and 2000, even after controlling for family background. They also document that the
enrolment patterns observable in the data are at variance with a simple model of college
attendance, even if they allow for borrowing constraints. Hence, there remains considerable
disagreement about the role of borrowing constraints (Kane (2006)).
In this paper, I want to shed further light on the role of financial constraints. In particular,
I address the following two questions:
1. Are borrowing constraints quantitatively important in determining college entry?
2. As the economic environment has changed in the U.S. over the course of the last decades,
have borrowing constraints become more limiting?
I answer these questions with the help of a computable overlapping generation model that
endogenizes the college enrolment decisions. Borrowing by young households for college ed-
ucation is not permitted; they thus have to rely on parental transfers and public support
in the form of subsidies in order to cover college expenses. This allows me to measure the
fraction of adolescents that would like to attend college but cannot do so because of market
imperfections.
In this paper, I generate parental transfers endogenously by assuming altruism on the side
of parents. At the time their children enter college, parents face a trade-off between making
transfers and own savings. Consequently, parental investment in their children’s college edu-
cation may be suboptimally low from the children’s point of view. I find that this trade-off
implies that a substantial fraction of 18 percent of young households is financially constrained
8
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in their college entry decision. This holds despite the fact that college enrolment gaps across
different family income groups appear to be narrow and broadly consistent with the empirical
results documented in Carneiro and Heckman (2002). This shows that even when enrolment
gaps are narrow, borrowing constraints may affect a large part of the population. The re-
sults thus help to resolve the disagreement in the empirical literature with respect to the
quantitative importance of borrowing constraints.1
I then examine how the economy behaves if I increase the college premium, the tuition
fees and the earnings inequality to values observable in the U.S. economy around 2000. I
find that the model replicates the college enrolment patterns presented in Belley and Lochner
(2007) very well. In particular, the model predicts (i) a slight increase in the number of college
graduates, (ii) a substantial increment in the impact of family income on the college enrolment
of young households, and a (iii) stable ability-enrolment pattern. The model predicts that
the fraction of constrained households rose sharply from 18 percent to 40 percent between
1980 and 2000. The results thus show that all enrolment patterns can be explained within
the same framework, and that these patterns are consistent with an increase in the number
of constrained households.
Despite the sharp rise in the number of households affected, the model implies that the
correlation of educational attainment across generations actually decreased. This is perhaps
surprising, as the literature in general assumes that tighter borrowing constraints lead to a
higher persistence of education across generations. Ellwood and Kane (2000) as well as Belley
and Lochner (2007) document that the correlation between parental education and college
enrolment of the child has become weaker over the course of the last decades.
The result that borrowing constraints became more limiting over time can be explained
with the impact of a rise in earnings inequality on parental transfers behavior. The rise in the
college premium (between-group inequality) makes college investment more profitable, even
for low-ability youths. If parents of low-ability children receive a greater share of their total
lifetime income from labor earnings, they accumulate disproportionately more precautionary
savings in response to the increase in the within-group inequality, which I model as an incre-
ment in the variance of earnings shocks. This implies that they have to reduce their transfers
accordingly, which results in a larger enrolment gap for low-ability students as only children
from rich parents (who depend less on labor income) can make profit from the increase in
the skill premium and invest in college. This is exactly what one observes in the data as well
(Belley and Lochner (2007)).
1Many empirical papers document data patterns that could be interpreted as evidence for the fact that
borrowing constraints are binding for a substantial fraction of the population. See for example Ellwood and
Kane (2000) and Kane (2006) and the references herein. In contrast, papers by Cameron and Heckman (1998),
Cameron and Heckman (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Cameron and Taber (2004) argue that
borrowing constraints do not play a major for college entry. Keane and Wolpin (2001) provide evidence for the
fact that constraints exist and are tight, yet not binding. When comparing the data from National Longitudinal
Survey of Young (NLSY), 1979 cohort, with the more recent 1997 cohort, Belley and Lochner (2007) document
that the relationship between family income and education attainment changed over time.
9
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Since earnings of high school graduates fluctuate more than the earnings of college gradu-
ates (Hubbard et al. (1995)) and earnings account for a bigger fraction of total income for high
school graduates, this channel also helps to explain the degree of intergenerational persistence
of educational attainment. In my framework, children of college graduated parents are – all
other things equal – up to 5 percent more likely to enter college, because their parents need
to provide less savings for their own future. Using transfers and savings data from the 1986
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), I find empirical support for this key prediction of the
model: high school graduates save significantly more than college graduates during the last
20 years before retirement if one controls for wealth and income. In turn, college graduates
in that age group provide significantly more transfers, all other things equal.
Understanding the behavior and the determinants of parental transfers is crucial for my
results. More precisely, I build on Laitner (2001) and assume that old households (’parents’)
are altruistic and incorporate the utility of their descendants (’young households’) in their
maximization problem. As in Laitner (2001), I allow for imperfect altruism; parents may
weight their children’s utility less than their own utility. Indeed, the transfer flows generated
by the model imply that parents consider their offspring’s utility by 30 percent less than their
own utility. In the model, I distinguish between two different levels of human capital (’college
education’ and ’high school’) and endogenize college choice. Parental transfers can be used
to finance college education, which is assumed to be costly.
I also allow for idiosyncratic labor income shocks, which enables me to analyze the effects
of the rise of the within-group inequality that has been documented for the U.S. (Krueger and
Perri (2006)). Incorporating inequality within generations and education levels also allows
me to distinguish different ability levels.
I solve the model numerically and calibrate the parameters such that key features of the
U.S. economy are matched. I then compare two different steady-state equilibria in order to
evaluate changes over time. Since the accumulation of wealth (and thus also transfer flows)
depend critically on the ratio of the interest rate to the subjective discount factor, I follow
Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1996) and use the discipline of general equilibrium models to
determine this ratio endogenously (see De Nardi (2004) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) for
an overview over this strand of the literature).
An increasing number of papers implement altruism in computable life cycle models with
endogenous education choice. Most recently, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2007) (hence-
forth GMV (2007)) propose an OLG model with one-sided altruism and sequential education
choice.2 GMV (2007) introduce an aggregate production function where different types of
human capital are not (necessarily) perfectly substitutable. They allow explicitly for changes
in life cycle earnings and wealth profiles. When estimating the earnings process, they also
2Early papers analyzing the general equilibrium implications of education policies include Heckman, Lochner
and Taber (1998) and A´bra´ha´m (2004), who examines wage inequality and education policy in a general
equilibrium OLG model with skill biased technological change.
10
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distinguish between permanent ability and idiosyncratic labor shocks. For their estimation,
GMV (2007) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) and the National Survey of Young (NLSY). With the help of their model,
the authors analyze the impact of different education policies on the equilibrium distribution
of earnings and education.
Cunha (2007) presents an incomplete markets, dynamic general equilibrium model of skill
formation. He allows for ability formation over many periods of childhood and adolescence,
considering the fact that skills at different stages may be complements and self-augmenting.
He builds on work by Laitner (1992), who assumes two-sided altruism: families care both
about their predecessors and their descendants.3 Using his model, Cunha (2007) compares
the equilibrium effects of different skill investment policies, focusing on how costly it is to
delay investment in the early years (childhood) and to remediate in later years (adolescence).
He finds that a policy that subsidizes early and late childhood investments dominates other
policies in terms of welfare.
Similarly, Caucutt and Lochner (2004) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) both use com-
putable frameworks with endogenous transfers to analyze the relative importance of early
versus late credit constraints.4 In this paper, I emphasize the various interactions between
parental wealth accumulation over the life cycle and transfer behavior. I focus on short-run
credit constraints for college education, thus abstracting from parental investment in early
education. According to empirical work presented in Keane and Wolpin (2001), students
finance at least 20 percent of their college expenses by receiving transfers from parents. In
total, parental support for their children’s college education is substantial. Gale and Scholz
(1994) document that parental payments amounted to 35 billion dollar in 1986.
As in the recent work by Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2007) (henceforth Brown et al.
(2007)), I argue that analyzing the intra-family allocation of resources is key for assessing
the significance of borrowing constraints for college education. Because the assumption of
one-sided altruism implies that parents do not have access to their children’s earnings, Brown
et al. (2007) show that borrowing constraints may arise because the parent household may be
poor relative to the child or care too little about the utility of the child to provide financial
help. In Brown et al. (2007), parents choose transfers for education in a first stage, and cash
transfers in a second stage. Parent and child households may thus disagree over the optimal
timing of transfers as well as the total amount. As stressed by Brown et al. (2007), the
potential for disagreement arises naturally in the context of U.S. college financial aid policy,
since a student’s federal assistance is determined based on their parent’s presumed ability
3Under this assumption, parents and children pool their resources and solve the same maximization problem.
Two-sided altruism thus implies that children provide transfers to their parents as well. However, there is little
evidence for this in the data (Gale and Scholz (1994)).
4Compared to Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Caucutt and Lochner (2004) allow for the accumulation of
capital and cash transfers and depart from the assumption that early and late investments in education have
a elasticity of substitution of 1.
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to pay. Parents are under no legal obligation to meet their expected contribution (Brown
et al. (2007), p.3). Using the NLSY97 and in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS),
Brown et al. (2007) find that borrowing constraints for higher education are quantitatively
important.
In this paper, I compare the quantitative predictions of a computable life cycle model with
one-sided altruism and an endogenous education choice with the college enrolment pattern
observable in the data. I find that the model is consistent with narrow enrolment gaps, after
I control for long-run factors. Nonetheless, the model implies that a substantial fraction of
young households is borrowing constrained in their college decision. I also show that within
the context of my model, recent changes in the economic environment in the U.S. imply that
the trade-off in the intra-family allocation of resources has worsened from the point of view
of the child, leading to a larger fraction of young households that have to rely on external
funding in order to pay for their college expenses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces the equilibrium definition, while the calibration is explained in Section
4. We discuss our results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Model
I consider a life cycle economy with altruistic parents. As in Laitner (2001), altruism may
be imperfect. Parents provide transfers to their children. They face constraints on their
resources: all credit markets are closed, implying that they can neither borrow against their
own future income nor against the future income of their descendants. I allow for idiosyncratic
productivity shocks during working life. Moreover, I endogenize college choice by assuming
that parental transfers can be used to pay for college education. These assumptions allow
me to study the effects of an endogenously generated initial distribution of assets on college
enrolment, and to analyze the determinants of the initial asset distribution in a realistic life
cycle setting.
1.2.1 The Life Cycle of a Household
There is a continuum of agents with total measure one. I assume that the size of the population
is constant over time. Let j denote the age of an agent, j ∈ J = {1, 2, ..., Jmax}. Agents enter
the economy when they turn 23 (model period j = 1). Before this age, they belong to their
parent household and depend on its economic decisions. During the first 40 years of their
’economic’ life, agents work. This implies that the agents work up to age 62 (model period
Jwork = 40). Retirement takes place at the age of 63 (j = 41), which is mandatory. When
agents turn 53 (j = 31), their children of age 23 form their own household. This implies a
generational age gap of 30 years. It is assumed that there is one child household for each
12
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parent household. Agents face a declining survival probability after their children leave home.
Terminal age is 83 (Jmax = 60). Since annuity markets are closed by assumption, agents may
leave some wealth upon the event of death. The remaining wealth of a deceased parent
household is passed on to its child household.
1.2.2 Transfers
At age 53, a parent’s household child becomes independent and forms its own household.
Gale and Scholz (1994) report that the mean age of givers is 55 years in the 1983-1986 Survey
of Consumer Finances. I assume that transfers are generated by one-sided altruism, that
is, parents care about the lifetime well-being of their mature children, but not the other
way round. I abstract from strategic interaction and assume that parents provide part of
their own wealth as an initial endowment at the beginning of the economic life of the child
household. Part of this endowment (or all of it) can be in form of investment in human
capital. It is important to notice that the assumption of altruism implies that parents will
combine education investment and financial transfers in such a way that the child’s lifetime
utility is maximized given the total amount of wealth that parents wish to pass on to their
descendants. Put differently, children may not agree with their parents on the total amount
which is being transferred, but certainly on the mix between human capital investment and
financial transfers.5
The assumptions regarding the life cycle and the transfer behavior are summarized in
Figure 1.1.
1.2.3 Labor Income Process
During each of the 40 periods of their working life, agents supply one unit of labor inelastically.
The productivity of this labor unit of an j-year old agent is measured by εejη
j,e, where
{
εej
}Jw
j=1
is a deterministic age profile of average labor productivity of an agent with education level e:
e ∈ E = {highschool(hs), college(col)} (1.1)
For retired agents, εej = 0.
ηj,e describes the stochastic labor productivity status of a j-year old agent with education
level e. Given the level of education e, I assume that the labor productivity process is identical
and independent across agents (no aggregate productivity shocks) and that it follows a finite-
state Markov process with stationary transition probabilities over time. More specifically,
Q(ηhs, Nhs) = Pr(ηj+1,hs ∈ Nhs|ηj,hs = ηhs) (1.2)
5In the following, I will use the terms ’financial transfers’, ’inter vivos transfers’ and ’inter vivos transfers’
as labels for capital transfers which take place during lifetime of both donor and recipient.
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23 53 83
Working life
• Work, consume, save
• Idiosyncratic productivity risk
Retirement
• consume
• mortality risk
• bequests
• investment in 
offspring’s education
• inter-vivos
transfers of wealth
Agents characterized by
• assets (from parents)
• education & product.
63
Figure 1.1: Life cycle and Generation Structure
for high-school graduates. Nhs =
{
ηhs1 , η
hs
2 , ..., η
hs
n
}
is the set of possible realizations of the
productivity shock ηhs. Similarly, I express the stochastic labor productivity process for
college graudates as
Q(ηcol, N col) = Pr(ηj+1,col ∈ N col|ηj,col = ηcol) (1.3)
with N col =
{
ηcol1 , η
col
2 , ..., η
col
n
}
.
I assume that children of college graduates have - on average - productivity levels above
average, while high school graduates draw shocks that are below average. Carneiro et al.
(2006) show that maternal education has a strong positive impact on children’s cognitive
achievement. I interpret the initial draw as a proxy for ability during adolescence, that is,
ability before college education or labor market entry occurs. In particular, I assume that the
probability to dropout from college decreases with the level of the initial productivity shock.
Consistent with empirical evidence regarding the intergenerational correlation of schooling,
this and the the fact that the productivity in the first period of working life depends on
parental education, implies that college education is positively correlated across generations.
The parental education level influences only the initial draw of the productivity shock: From
the second period onwards, the shocks evolve according to their respective stochastic process.
More specifically, I assume that the initial shock is governed by the following transition
matrices:
Qinitial,hs(i, i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}) = Pr(i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} |η30,hs = ηhs) (1.4)
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Qinitial,col(i, i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}) = Pr(i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} |η30,col = ηcol) (1.5)
1.2.4 Investment in Education and Borrowing Constraints
I distinguish between two levels of education, high school and college.6 Upon entering the
economy, all households possess a high school degree. They (or their parents) decide on
investing in college education, before any other economic action is taken. Investment in
college education takes place at the beginning of the lifetime. College education requires
large investments that are risky and lumpy. It is risky because there is a certain probability
that the child drops out. In addition, the earnings stream is stochastic which increases the
uncertainty. Dropout rates are high in the U.S., as well as in other OECD countries (see
Akyol and Athreya (2005)). Consistent with evidence from the empirical literature, see e.g.
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007), I assume that children with lower levels of ability are
more likely to drop out. Since dropout rates are higher during the first years of the college
studies (when returns to college education are low), dropouts face the same earnings process
as high school graduates. Consequently, only students who actually graduate from college
enjoy higher mean earnings during their working life. This implies that college education is
an indivisible and lumpy investment.7 Transfers and savings cannot be negative; parents are
thus required to finance their children’s college education out of their own resources.
1.2.5 Taxes and Social Security Benefits
During working life, households pay a proportional tax on their labor income. All households
also pay a proportional tax on their capital income.
Tax revenue from labor income and capital income taxation is used by an infinitely lived
government in order to finance pension benefits pen. I assume that pensions are independent
of the employment history of a retiree.
1.3 The Households’ Recursive Problem
I distinguish between young households (children) and parent households. I use a subscript
y for young households and a subscript p for parental households.
1.3.1 Young households
When parents die, young households inherit the wealth of their parents. I assume that
young households observe their parental wealth holdings. Therefore, I need to distinguish
6The share of high school dropouts is small in the data, see Rodriguez et al. (2002) who measure a share
of 17 percent in the 1998 SCF.
7See Akyol and Athreya (2005) and the references cited therein.
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between child households with deceased parents and young households that are expecting to
inherit. I make the following timing assumption: death takes place at the end of the period,
after the consumption and savings decision has been made. Bequests are then distributed
at the beginning of the next period. As in De Nardi (2004), annuity markets are closed by
assumption, which implies that part of the bequests are left accidentally.
Young households with deceased parents
Consider a household during working age (j ∈ Jw = {1, ..., 30}) whose parent household is
dead. At age j, this household consumes cy,d and has end-of-period wealth holdings of a′y,d,
where the subscript y, d indicates a young household with deceased parents. Given a discount
factor β, a rate of return to capital r, a wage rate per efficiency unit of labor w, tax rates on
labor income and capital income τw and τk, the optimization problem of this household reads
as
Vy,d(sy,d) = max
cy,d,a
′
y,d
u(cy,d) + β ∑
η′∈Ne
Vy,d(s′y,d)Q(η, η
′)
∀j ∈ {1, ...30− 1} (1.6)
where Vy,d(.) is the value function of a young household with deceased parents and sy,d is the
vector of state variables in period j, which is given by
sy,d = (ay,d, e, ηj,e, j) (1.7)
Agents maximize (1.6) subject to the budget constraint8
a′y,d = (1 + r(1− τk))ay,d + (1− τw)εejηj,ew − cy,d (1.8)
a′y,d ≥ 0
The state space Sy,d of an household of type y, d thus includes four variables: own asset
holdings, ay,d ∈ R+, education level, e ∈ E, stochastic productivity, ηj,e ∈ N j,e, and age
j ∈ {1, ..., 30}. Notice that Sy,d = R+×E×N e×{1, ..., 30}. Let P(E), P(N e) and P{1, ..., 30}
be the power sets of E,N e and {1, ..., 30}, respectively, and let B(R+) the Borel σ-algebra of
R+. It follows that Sy,d = B(R+)×P(E)×P(N e)×P(Jw) is a σ-algebra on Sy,d and that
My,d= (Sy,d,Sy,d) is a measurable space. I will assume that the value function Vy,d :Sy,d → R
8Notice that for j = 30, the value function reads as
Vy,d(sy,d) = max
cy,d,a
′
y,d
u(cy,d) + β∑
i
∑
η′∈Ne
Vp,1(sp,1)Q(η, η
′)Qinitial,e(η, i)

When j = 30, child households become parent household in j+1. This implies that they observe their offspring
’s initial productivity level which becomes part of their state vector sp,1.
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and the policy functions cy,d :Sy,d → R+ and a′y,d :Sy,d → R+ are measurable with respect to
My,d.
Young households whose parents are alive
At any age j ∈ {1, ..., 30}, a household whose parents are still alive consumes cy,a and has
end-of-period wealth holdings of a′y,a, where y, a denotes a young household whose parents
are alive. Its parent household has wealth holdings of apy,a. Since the child does not know
when the parent household dies, the value function is a weighted sum of the utility it receives
if the parent household dies and the utility which is obtained if the parent continues to live
for another period, where the parental survival probability ψj+30 serves as a weight. The
optimization problem can thus be described by the following functional equation:
Vy,a(sy,a) = max
cy,a,a′y,a
{
u(cy,a) + β(1− ψj+30)
∑
η′∈Ne Vy,d(s
′
y,d)Q(η, dη
′)
+βψj+30
∑
η′∈Ne Vy,a(s
′
y,a)Q(η, dη
′)
}
(1.9)
∀j ∈ {1, ...30− 1} 9
where Vy,a(sy,a) denotes the value function given the state vector sy,a, and sy,a is described
by
sy,a = (ay,a, ap′y,a, e, η
j,e, j) (1.10)
Notice that children observe only their parents end-of-period asset holdings. This implies
that the law of motion of parental asset holdings is not part of the information set of the child
household.10
The household maximizes (1.9) subject to its current period budget constraint
a′y,a = (1 + r(1− τk))ay,a + (1− τw)εejηj,ew − cy,a (1.11)
a′y,a ≥ 0
9If j = 30, the child household knows that its parent household will die for sure in the current period. The
Bellman equation thus reads as
Vy,a(sy,a) = max
cy,a,a′y,a
u(cy,d) + β∑
i
∑
η′∈Ne
Vp,1(sp,1)Q(η, η
′)Qinitial,e(η, i)

10I also experimented with a model in which children use the policy function of their respective parents’
problem in order to update their information about expected bequests. This adds another two variables to
the child household’s state space, namely the education and the productivity level of the parent households,
thereby resulting in a dramatic increase in CPU time needed to solve the model. I found that parental asset
holdings alone are sufficient to forecast future bequests. Including education and productivity did not change
the child’s behavior at all.
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If the parent household dies in period j − 1, the flow budget constraint becomes
a′y,d = (1 + r(1− τk))(ay,a + apy,a) + (1− τw)εejηj,ew − cy,a (1.12)
a′y,d ≥ 0
Because a child household keeps track of its parents wealth holding, I need to extend the state
space Sy,a by a
p
y,a ∈ R+. The state space contains now two continuous variables, and is given
by Sy,a = R+ × R+ ×E ×N e × {1, ..., 30}. Similar to the problem of a child household with
deceased parents given above, I define a measurable spaceMy,a= (Sy,a,Sy,a), with respect to
which Vy,a :Sy,a → R, cy,a :Sy,a → R+ and a′y,a :Sy,a → R+ are measurable.
1.3.2 Parent Households
Consider now a parent household, 31 ≤ j ≤ Jmax. A parent household works during the
first 10 years and is retired afterwards. The household faces a declining survival probability,
ψj < 1. In the following, I define the parent household’s problem in three different stages.
Parent Household, Working
Vp,w(sp,w) = max
cp,w,a′p,w
u(cp,w) + βψj ∑
η′∈Ne
Vp,w(s′p,w)Q(η, η
′)
∀j ∈ {32, ...40} (1.13)
where Vp,w(.) is the value function of a parent household who is working and sp,w is the vector
of state variables in period j given by
sp,w = (ap,w, e, ηj,e, j) (1.14)
Agents maximize (1.13) subject to the budget constraint
a′p,w = (1 + r(1− τk))ap,w + (1− τw)εejηj,ew − cp,w (1.15)
a′p,w ≥ 0
The state space is given by Sy,a = R+ × E × N e × {32, ...40}. I define a measurable space
Mp,w= (Sp,w,Sp,w), with respect to which Vp,w :Sp,w → R, cp,w :Sp,w → R+ and a′p,w :Sp,w →
R+ are measurable.
Parent Household, Retired
This household receives social security benefits, pen, and chooses consumption cp,r and its
end-of-period wealth level a′p,r. The optimization problem of this household can be written
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in recursive formulation as follows:
Vp,r(sp,r) = max
cp,r,a′p,r
{
u(cp,r) + βψjVp,r(s′p,r)
}
(1.16)
∀j ∈ {41, ...Jmax − 1}
where Vp,r(sp,r) is the value function, given the state vector sp,r. It follows that
sp,r = (ap,r, j) (1.17)
The household maximizes (1.16) subject to
a′p,r = (1 + r(1− τk))ap,r + pen− cp,r (1.18)
a′p,r ≥ 0
In the terminal period Jmax, (1.16) reduces to
Vp,r(sp,r) = max
cp,r
{u(cp,r)} (1.19)
subject to
cp,r ≤ (1 + r(1− τk))ap,r + pen (1.20)
The state space is now given by Sp,r = R+ × {41, ..., Jmax}. I construct a measurable
space Mp,r= (Sp,r,Sp,r), with respect to which I define Vp,r :Sp,r → R, cp,r :Sp,r → R+ and
a′p,r :Sp,r → R+ to be measurable.
Parent Household, First Period
I assume that parents incorporate the discounted lifetime utility of their children in the first
period of parenthood (j = 31). This assumption of one-sided altruism is also used in various
other papers, e.g. Laitner (2001), Nishiyama (2002), and most recently Brown et al. (2007)
and GMV (2007).
Parents choose their own savings a′p,1 and the transfers to their child household in such
a way that their total utility is maximized. Transfers can be in form of assets (tra) and
investment in education (ed). Recall that the education level is a binary variable, that is,
ed ∈ {0, 1}, where ed = 0 if parents choose not to send their children to college and ed = 1 if
parents send their children to college. Expressed in terms of a Bellman equation, the decision
problem of a parent household at j = 31 reads as
Vp,1(sp,1) = max
cp,1,a′p,1,tra,ed
{
u(cp) + βψ31
∑
η′∈Ne Vp,w(s
′
p,w)Q(η, η
′)
+ς (E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 1] + E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 0])
}
(1.21)
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where ς is the intergenerational discount factor. I allow for imperfect altruism, that is,
0 ≤ ς ≤ 1. If ς = 0, parents care only about their own utility. The model thus nests a pure
life cycle economy (ς = 0) and a dynastic model (ς = 1) as extreme cases. Both Laitner
(2001) and Nishiyama (2002) show that the observable flow of transfers is consistent with
an intermediate case. Clearly, the degree of altruism matters for parental transfer behavior.
Notice that it influences only the total amount of resources which is transferred, but does not
have any effect on the division into education investment and financial transfers.
Vp,1(sp,1) is the value function for a given state vector sp,1, where
sp,1 = (ap,1, e, η31,e, i) (1.22)
Notice that the initial productivity level of a child i becomes part of the parent household’s
state space because the child may drop out before graduating. i determines the probability
to drop out. Together with the fact that the income stream is stochastic, this implies that
investment in college is risky. Therefore, whether parents invest in the children’s education
beyond high school depends on the difference between E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 1], the expected
utility from investing, and E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 0], the value if they do not invest. More precisely,
the expected utility from investing is given by
E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 1] =
{
λ(i)Vy,a(tra, a′p,1, col, η1,col, 1)
+(1− λ(i))Vy,a(tra, a′p,1, hs, η1,hs, 1)
}
(1.23)
where λ(i) is the probability that the child household completes college education successfully.
The expected utility is thus a weighted average of the expected lifetime utility if the child
completes education and of the expected value of the household if it does not complete
education. If the child household enters college but does not complete college education,
the child household faces the same value function as a child household which does not enter
college education. The parental budget constraint is given by
a′p,1 = (1 + r(1− τk))ap,1 + (1− τw)εejη31,ew+ ν|ed=1(ap,1, εejη31,ew)− tra−κ|ed=1 − cp,1 (1.24)
a′p,1 ≥ 0
where ν denotes the college subsidy the household receives if ed = 1, κ denotes the fixed
college expenses that the parent household pays. The subsidy level ν is a function of family
resources available for college investment. In the U.S., most programs are targeted towards
students of low income families. In this case, the amount of subsidies depends negatively on
the amount of family resources (see e.g. Feldstein (1995)).
Note that children may also receive end-of-life bequests. Because average bequests are
higher the more the parent saves in period j = 31, the value function of the child,Vy,a(sy,a),
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is increasing and concave in a′p,1. Because the parent household incorporates Vy,a(sy,a) in
its decision problem in j = 31, it also incorporates the utility from leaving bequests. This
establishes a trade-off between transferring resources in the form of inter vivos transfers or in
the form of end-of-life bequests. Note that this mechanism would also work in the presence
of a perfect annuity market.
Using the fact that the state space of parents in their first period is given by Sp,1 =
R+ × E ×N e × {1, 2, ..., i}, I construct a σ-algebra on Sp,1 as Sp,1 = B(R+)×P({1, 2, ..., i})
×P(E) × P(N e) where P({1, 2, ..., i}) is the power set of {1, 2, ..., i}. Mp,1= (Sp,1,Sp,1) is
then a measurable space, which implies that Vp,1 :Sp,1 → R, cp,1 :Sp,1 → R+, a′p,1 :Sp → R+,
tra :Sp,1 → R+ and ed :Sp,1 → {0, 1} are measurable on Mp,1.
1.3.3 The Firm’s Problem
There is a continuum of firms, which I normalize to have total measure one. Firms are
competitive and take all prices as given. Thus, I assume a single representative firm. This
representative firm uses aggregate physical capital K and aggregate labor measured in effi-
ciency units L to produce a single identical output good Y . The profit-maximizing conditions
of the representative firm are
r + δ = FK(K,L) (1.25)
w = FL(K,L) (1.26)
where F (K,L) is a constant returns to scale production function.
1.3.4 The Government’s Problem
The infinitely lived government administers the pension system and distributes college sub-
sidies. The government finances pension benefits and subsidies by issuing a payroll tax on
labor and capital income. I impose that the budget of the government has to be balanced
in each period. Let Φ be a probability measure defined over the measurable spaces My,d,
My,a, Mp,1,Mp,w and Mp,r, which result from the household problem as stated above.11
The government computes old-age pension benefits, pen, as the average lifetime income of a
high-school graduate times a social security replacement ratio:
pen = rep
w
(∫
R+×{hs}×Nhs×Jw ε
hs
j η
j,hsdΦ +
∫
R+×{hs}×Nhs×Jw ε
hs
j η
j,hsdΦ
)
∫
R+×{hs}×Nhs×Jw dΦ +
∫
R+×{hs}×Nhs×Jw dΦ
(1.27)
11Notice that the total population size is normalized to one. The probability measure thus defines the number
of people (or equivalently, the total population share) facing a specific endowment with state variables.
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I assume that tax rate levied on capital, τk, is determined exogenously. The government’s
problem thus reduces to adjusting tax rate on labor income τw such that budget is balanced:
τw =
pen
(∫
Sp,r
dΦ
)
+ Ξ− τkrK
wL
(1.28)
where the total amount of college subsidies Ξ is given by
Ξ =
∫
Sp,1
ν|ed=1dΦ (1.29)
1.4 Definition of a Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
I now define the equilibrium that I study:
Definition 1 Given a replacement rate, rep, and a tax rate for capital income, τk , a college
subsidy rule ν, a Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a set of functions Vy,d(sy,d),
Vy,a(sy,a), Vp,1(sp,1), Vp,w(sp,w), Vp,r(sp,r), cy,d(sy,d), cy,a(sy,a), cp,1(sp,1), cp,w(sp,w), cp,r(sp,r),
a′y,d(sy,d), a
′
y,a(sy,a), a
′
p,1(sp,1), a
′
p,w(sp,w), a
′
p,r(sp,r), tra(sp,1), ed(sp,1), non-negative prices
of physical capital and of effective labor, {r, w}, and set of probability measures on the state
spaces of the respective household problem as defined in sections (1.3.1)-(1.3.2) such that the
following hold:
1. Given prices and policies, Vy,d(sy,d), Vy,a(sy,a), Vp,1(sp,1), Vp,w(sp,w) and Vp(sp) are the
solution to the household problem outlined in (1.3.1)-(1.3.2) with cy,d(sy,d), cy,a(sy,a),
cp,1(sp,1), cp,w(sp,w), cp(sp), a′y,d(sy,d), a
′
y,a(sy,a), a
′
p,1(sp,1), a
′
p,w(sp,w), a
′
p(sp), tra(sp,1),
ed(sp,1) being the associated policy functions.
2. The prices r and w solve the firm’s problem (1.25) and (1.26).
3. The government policies satisfy (1.27), (1.28) and (1.29).
4. Markets for physical capital, labor in efficiency units and the consumption good clear:
K =
{ ∫
Sy,d
a′y,d(sy,d)dΦ +
∫
Sy,a
a′y,a(sy,a)dΦ
+
∫
Sp,1
a′p,1(sp,1)dΦ +
∫
Sp,w
a′p,w(sp,w)dΦ +
∫
Sp
a′p(sp)dΦ
}
(1.30)
L =
{ ∫
Sy,d
εejη
j,edΦ +
∫
Sy,a
εejη
j,edΦ
+
∫
Sp,1
εejη
j,edΦ +
∫
Sp,w
εejη
j,edΦ
}
(1.31)
C + [K − (1− δ)K] + T + I − Ξ = F (K,L) (1.32)
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where
C =

∫
Sy,d
cy,d(sy,d)dΦ +
∫
Sy,a
cy,a(sy,a)dΦ
+
∫
Sp,1
cp,1(sp,1)dΦ +
∫
Sp,w
cp,w(sp,w)dΦ +
∫
Sp
cp(sp)dΦ
 (1.33)
T =
∫
Sp,1
tra(sp,1)dΦ (1.34)
I = κ
∫
Sp,1
ed(sp,1)dΦ− ν
∫
Sp,1
ed(sp,1)dΦ (1.35)
5. The Aggregate Law of Motion is stationary:
Φ = H(Φ) (1.36)
The function H is generated by the policy functions a′y,d(sy,d), a
′
y,a(sy,a), a
′
p,1(sp,1),
a′p(sp), tra(sp,1), ed(sp,1), the Markov process Q(ηe, N e) and the transmission matrix
Qinitial,e(i, i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}) and can be written explicitly as
(a) For all sets (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ) with J = {2, ..., 30} such that (A,Ap, E ,N ,J ) ∈ Sy,a,
the measure of agents whose parents are alive is given by
Φa =
∫
Sy,a
Py,a(sy,a, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ))dΦa (1.37)
where Py,a(sy,a, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ))
=
 ψ(j+30)
∑
η′∈N e
Q(η, η′) if a′y,a(sy,a) ∈ A, a′p(sp) ∈ Ap, e = e′ ∈ E , j + 1 ∈ J
0 otherwise
Py,a(sy,a, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J )) is the transition function. It gives the probability that
an agent with endowment sy,a at age j ends up in j+1 with asset holdings a′y,a ∈ A,
productivity state η′ ∈ N e and parental asset holdings a′p ∈ Ap. The education level
remains constant.
(b) For all sets (A, E ,N e,J ) with J = {2, ..., 30} such that (A, E ,N ,J ) ∈ Sy,d, the
measure of agents with deceased parents is given by
Φd =
{ ∫
Sy,d
Py,d(sy,d, (A, E ,N e,J ))dΦd+∫
Sy,a
(1− ψj+30)Py,a(sy,a, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ))dΦa
}
(1.38)
where Py,d(sy,d, (A, E ,N e,J ))
=

∑
η′∈N e
Q(η, η′) if a′y,a(sy,a) ∈ A, e = e′ ∈ E , j + 1 ∈ J
0 otherwise
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As fraction (1− ψj+30) of parents dies in period j, Φd incorporates the measure of
young agents whose parents died in the previous period.
(c) For all sets (A, I,J ) with J = {31} such that (A, I,J ) ∈ Sp,1, the measure of
parent households in j = 31 is given by
Φp,1 =

∫
Sy,d
Pp,1(sy,d, (A, I,J ))dΦd
+
∫
Sy,a
Pp,1(sy,a, (A, I,J ))dΦa
 (1.39)
where Pp,1(sy,d, (A, I,J ))
=

∑
i′∈I
Qinitial,e(i, i′) if a′y,a(sy,a) ∈ A, j + 1 ∈ J
0 otherwise
and Pp,1(sy,d, (A, I,J )) follows straightforwardly.
Pp,1(., (A, I,J )) shows the transition from child households to parent households.
The measure of parent households collects all child households.
(d) The measure of parent households while working is generated in a similar fashion.
(e) For all sets (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ) with J = {1} such that (A,Ap, E ,N ,J ) ∈ Sy,a, the
measure of agents in their first period is given by
Φinitial =
∫
Sp,1
P initialp,1 (sp,1, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J ))dΦp,1 (1.40)
where P initialp,1 (sp,1, (A,Ap, E ,N e,J )) is given by a′p,1(sp,1), tra(sp,1) and ed(sp,1)
where a′p,1(sp,1) ∈ A, tra(sp,1) ∈ Ap and ed(sp,1) ∈ E.
(f) The measure of agents during retirement is generated by the policy function a′p(sp)
where a′p(sp) ∈ A.
A few remarks regarding the equilibrium conditions are in order. (1.30) and (1.31) state
that aggregate physical capital and labor measured in efficiency units follow from aggregating
the respective holdings of each agent and weighting them appropriately. (1.32) requires that
the good market clears, i.e. that the demand for goods, which is shown on the left-hand side,
is equal to the supply of goods. The term [K − (1− δ)K] on the left-hand side determines the
amount of investment that is necessary to keep the aggregate capital stock constant, whereas
I and T are aggregate college expenditures and transfers in stationary state, respectively.
(1.36) requires stationarity of the probability measure Φ. The function H is the transition
function which determines the probability that an agent will end up with a certain combi-
nation of state variables tomorrow, given his endowment with state variables today. Notice
that the stationarity condition requires that child households are (on average) ’identical’ to
their parents in the sense that they reproduce their parent household’s distribution once they
24
Winter, Christoph (2009), Altruism, Education and Inequality in the United States 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26812
become parents themselves. This in turn implies that the distribution of transfers and inher-
itances that child households receive is consistent with the distribution of transfers that is
actually left by parent households. I present more details about the computational procedure
in the appendix.
1.5 Parametrization and Calibration
I calibrate parameter values of the benchmark economy to represent relevant features of
the U.S. economy as closely as possible. It will be assumed that the length of one unit of
time in the model economy corresponds to a calendar year. The targets that I choose for the
benchmark economy describe the U.S. economy around 1980. I therefore label this benchmark
case ’economy 1980’. In order to compare the change of enrolment patterns over time, I define
a second steady-state which I denote as ’economy 2000’.
1.5.1 Economy 1980
Technology, Demographics and Preferences
I assume that the utility from consumption in each period is given by u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ . Production
is assumed to follow the aggregate production function F (K,L) = KαL1−α, where L is
aggregate labor measured in efficiency units (see equation 1.31). By assumption, college
graduates have a skill premium and supply more labor in efficiency units compared to high
school graduates. Implicitly, this assumes that efficiency units supplied by high school and
college graduates are perfect substitutes in the production process. GMV (2007) allow for
imperfect substitutability. I set the capital share in income (α) equal to 0.36, as estimated by
Prescott (1986). Following Imrohoroglu et. al. (1995) and Heer (2001), I assume that capital
depreciates at an annual rate of 8 percent. The conditional survival probability ψj is taken
from the National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2004) and refers to the conditional
survival probability for the U.S. population. Only values between age 53 and age 82 are
used. I assume that the survival probability is zero for agents at the age of 83. The survival
probability for households that are younger than 53 years is assumed to be equal to 1.12 The
preference parameter γ determines the relative risk aversion and is the inverse relation to the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. I follow Attanasio (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) who estimate γ using consumption data and find a value of 1.5. This value is well in
the interval of 1 to 3 commonly used in the literature.
The two main parameters that govern the accumulation of wealth and transfer behavior -
the discount factor β and the intergenerational discount factor ς - are calibrated jointly such
that the baseline economy is consistent with the wealth-income ratio and the relative size of
intergenerational transfers in the U.S. economy in 1980. Gale and Scholz (1994) compute a
12The actual survival probability before 53 is close to 1. See the National Vital Statistics Report.
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ratio of inter vivos transfers to total wealth of 0.28 percent from the 1983 and 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances. This number comprises financial non-college support to children. The
resulting ς is 0.7, which implies that for the benchmark economy to be consistent with the
transfer flows observable in the U.S. economy, a parent household would have to consider the
utility of a child household 30 percent less than it considers its own utility. This is in line
with results obtained from Nishiyama (2002) who uses an altruistic framework to explain the
observable degree of wealth inequality in U.S. economy.
Earnings Process
I assume that the process that governs the productivity shocks ηj,e follow an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ρhs for high school graduates and ρcol for college graduates. The
variance of the innovations are σhs and σcol, respectively. These parameters are estimated by
Hubbard et al. (1995)(HSZ in the following) from the 1982 to 1986 Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). They find that high school graduates have a lower earnings persistence
and a higher variance (ρhs = 0.946, σhs = 0.025) compared to college graduates (ρcol = 0.955,
σcol = 0.016). It should be noted that both estimates are rather conservative as HSZ use the
combined labor income of the husband and wife (if married) plus unemployment insurance
for their estimates. When I approximate the earnings process with a four-state Markov
process using the procedure proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991), I find that the transition
matrices for high school and college graduates are nearly indistinguishable.
I also take the average age-efficiency profile εej from HSZ, which gives us an estimate of
the college premium for different age groups. The authors find that earnings are more peaked
for college families, which is in line with findings from other empirical studies. Different
from the model estimated by HSZ, I endogenize the college enrolment decision. This implies
that in equilibrium, college graduates are more likely to have positive deviations with the
respect to the average age profile, because more productive children (measured in terms of
their first draw from the productivity distribution) are more likely to attend college. This is
not reflected in the estimation of the mean age-earnings profile of HSZ. I thus adjust the age
profile for college graduates in the model downwards, such that the average college premium
after selection coincides in both models. By estimating a fixed-effect model, GMV (2007)
propose an alternative way of calibrating the earnings process.
For the economy 1980, I also adjust their estimates for the earnings variance. The reason
is that HSZ estimate their model for the beginning of the 1980’s. Parents who decide upon
transfers in the beginning of the 1980’s accumulated their wealth in the 1970’s or even ear-
lier. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) find that the variance of both permanent and transitory
earnings increased by 40 percent between the two decades. For the economy 1980, I thus use
a σhs of 0.015 and σcol of 0.01.
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College Completion and Cost of College
I assume that the probability of college completion λ(i) is an increasing function of the initial
productivity state i. In particular, I assume
λ(i) = d+ a(i− 1) (1.41)
d, a ≥ 0
Recall that I approximate the AR(1) process with a 4-state Markov chain; I therefore have
a grid with 4 points that represent the different productivity levels. Consequently, the pa-
rameter d governs the completion probability for child households with low ability (i = 1).
d thus governs the expected return associated with college investment. I set d such that the
college participation rate of low ability students with parents in the highest income quartile
is 0.3. This is also the enrolment share of low-ability children from families in the highest
income quartile in the NLSY79 as reported by Belley and Lochner (2007).13 I use families
from the highest income quartile as a calibration target because financial constraints are not
very likely to have an impact on their college enrolment decision (Carneiro and Heckman
(2002)). Instead, I impose that their decision is solely based on the expected return, which
is governed by d. For d = 0.32, the benchmark steady-state replicates the enrolment share of
high-income families with children of low ability. This implies that these students graduate
with a probability of 32 percent.
Two additional parameters influence the college investment behavior, the tuition costs
κ and the slope parameter a. I calibrate these parameters jointly such that the model is
consistent with an overall dropout probability of 50 percent (Restuccia and Urrutia (2004))
and a fraction of college graduates of 25 percent. I obtain a κ of 0.95 and an a of 0.07. In line
with U.S. evidence, the model implies that total college expenses are approximately equal to
GDP per-capita(see e.g. Collegeboard (2005) or Gallipoli et al. (2007)). A slope parameter a
of 0.07 implies that high-ability children have a 21 percent higher change of graduating from
college than low-ability children.
Transmission of Initial Productivity
In the data, there is a high degree of persistence in economic outcomes across generations.
Inheritability of genetic traits, the family environment and early education all matter for
explaining different levels of pre-college ability levels Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). Following
Keane and Wolpin (2001), I assume that the transmission of initial productivity levels depends
13Belley and Lochner (2007) use the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a proxy for ability. AFQT
test scores are a widely used measure of cognitive achievement by social scientists using the NLSY and are
strongly correlated with positive outcomes like education and post-school earnings. See their footnote 2 for
further references
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solely on the level of parental education. Technically, I generate a positive link by assuming
that parents transmit part of their productivity shock at age j = 30 to their children, who
enter the economy when parents turn to j = 31.
Because transmission depends on parental education, I define two separate transition
matrices for parents with high school and college education, Qinitial,hs and Qinitial,col. Let
pcolip,ic∀{1, ..., 4} be an element of the transition matrix of college graduates. Then, pcolip,ic is
the probability that a college educated parent household of age j = 30 is of productivity ip,
while the child receives an initial productivity of ic. In order to achieve a positive link across
generations, it needs to be that pcolip,ic ≥ phsip,ic for ’high’ levels of ic and pcolip,ic ≤ phsip,ic for ’low’
levels ic. In addition, I require that pip,ic > 0 to ensure that there are non-trivial percentages
in all productivity levels. Moreover, the probabilities in each row of the transition matrix
have to sum to 1,
∑
ic pip,ic = 1.
Limited by these conditions, I model both transition matrices as linear combinations
between an identity matrix and a matrix which rows consist of an additive sequence. For
college graduates, this sequence has starting value 0, increment (n−1)n2 and n elements, where
n is the number of productivity shocks. Let pi be the weight of this matrix and (1 − pi) the
weight of the identity matrix. Then, pip,ic ≥ 0 requires pi ∈ (0, 1). pi is calibrated such that the
model reproduces the correlation of college education across generations. Data from NLSY 79
reported by Keane and Wolpin (2001), Table 4, suggests that this correlation is between 0.28
and 0.38, depending on the youth’s level of completed schooling at age 16. The correlation
of education college attainment is significantly weaker if I consider only parent-child pairs for
which the children’s schooling level at the age of 16 is similar. Since I do not model differences
pre-tertiary education, I choose pi such that the model implies a correlation of 0.31.
College Subsidies and Taxes
Parents who send their children to college receive a government subsidy ν|ed=1(ap,1, ε
e
jη
j,ew)
for each unit of expenditure in college education. The subsidy is a function of current income
and asset holdings. In the U.S., the calculation of the subsidy is based on an estimate of
the student’s family ability to pay the cost of college. This estimate is based on estimates
of ’discretionary income’ and ’available assets’ Feldstein (1995). I approximate discretionary
income as the sum of labor and capital income, net of taxes. Available assets are calculated as
the difference between current wealth holdings and a wealth level that is deemed to maintain
the current standard of living, which I approximate by the average asset holdings in the
economy, called a. These two measures are then combined by adding 12 percent of the
available net assets to the discretionary income, see Feldstein (1995).
The key point of the exercise is that every extra dollar of savings raises the amount of
available resources, which decreases the subsidy. Feldstein (1995) points out that this indirect
savings tax may generate strong disincentives for the accumulation of wealth. For simplicity
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and because this specification is common in the literature, I assume that the subsidy level is
linearly decreasing in the level of parental resources:
ν = max(ν0 − ν1(max(0, ap,1 − a) + (1− τw) rap,1 (1− τw) εejηj,ew), 0) (1.42)
ν0, ν1 ≥ 0
I calibrate ν0 and ν1 such that (i) the ratio of college subsidies to total college expenses,
the subsidy rate, is 0.4, as reported by the OECD (see Akyol and Athreya (2005), Figure 1)
and (ii) the subsidy does not cover more than 50 percent of κ, the total college expenses an
individual household has to pay, see Keane and Wolpin (2001). This implies estimates of ν0
of 0.57 and of ν1 of 0.1. Following De Nardi (2004), I use a capital income tax rate τK of
0.2 and a replacement rate for pension benefits of 0.4. Finally, I adjust the tax rate on labor
income τw such that the government budget (1.28) is balanced. This results in a tax rate of
15 percent. The results are summarized in Table 1.2.
1.5.2 Economy 2000
I adjust the average college premium, the earnings process and the tuition fees in order to
account for the increase in between-group inequality, within-group inequality and the doubling
of the college expenses (in real terms, see Collegeboard (2005)). All other parameter values
are left unchanged. The college premium increases by 30 percentage points (from 40 percent
to 70 percent compared to our benchmark case (see Katz and Autor (1999)).
1.6 Results
In this section, I analyze the quantitative behavior of our benchmark economy. In particular, I
use my model as a measurement tool in order to evaluate to what extend borrowing constraints
are binding.
1.6.1 Economy 1980: How Important are Borrowing Constraints?
In this section, I show that the fraction of households that is borrowing constrained in their
college decision is 18 percent, which is substantially higher than what estimates from the
empirical literature suggest. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find that at most 8 percent of
the population are borrowing constrained in the short-run sense. I argue that the difference
is due to the measurement of long-term factors and the fact that parents are imperfectly
altruistic. If I apply their methodology to the data generated by the model, my results are
broadly consistent with their findings.
29
Winter, Christoph (2009), Altruism, Education and Inequality in the United States 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26812
The Fraction of Constrained Households
In order to measure the fraction of constrained young households, I start with an experiment
in which I allow parents to borrow up the total college expenses. I implement the loan as a
transfer from the government to all parents before they decide on how much to invest in their
children. In order to keep its budget balanced, the government in turn collects the resources
from the child households. The debt contract takes the form of a redeemable loan, for which
the annual redemption sum is fixed and independent of the child household’s income.
Now, I ’force’ parents to use the loan for their children, either in form of financial transfers
or in form of college investment or both. Parents cannot use the additional resources for their
own consumption. It is important to notice that this experiment is equivalent to a scenario
where the child households are offered a loan directly, and where they decide themselves
whether they want to invest in human capital or in financial assets.14 If the total loan
amount is transferred in form of financial assets, the net present value of the loan is zero by
construction.15
I find that the second experiment raises the total college enrolment rate to 75 percent, an
increase of 18 percentage points relative to the benchmark economy. From this it follows that
the presence of borrowing constraints for college education is associated with a decrease in
the college enrolment rates of 18 percent relative to an economy where enrolment is dictated
solely by the expected value of going to college. This result exceeds the findings from the
empirical literature considerably. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) conclude that the fraction
of constrained households in the population is at most 8 percent. In the next two sections, I
shed further light on the difference between my results and theirs. I show that once I apply
their methodology to the data generated by my model, the results broadly coincide.
The result that borrowing constraints for higher education are quantitatively important
is in line with empirical evidence provided by Brown et al. (2007). Based on the HRS and the
NLSY97, Brown et al. (2007) find that financial aid has a positive and significant impact on
college educational attainment when no (post-)schooling cash transfers are reported. When
positive transfers are reported, this relationship disappears. Brown et al. (2007) interpret
this as evidence for the fact that there is a significant fraction of families that are too poor,
or not altruistic enough, to provide sufficient transfer to finance their children’s education.
Enrolment Gap
I now examine how the model compares to the data as regards to enrolment gaps between
income groups. For the 1980 economy, I compute the college enrolment rate by family income
and ability level. Figure 1.3 plots the results.
14Because parents choose the optimal mix between financial transfers and college investment such that they
maximize their own utility and their children’s utility is part of their total utility, the parental decision about
the optimal division of the loan coincides with the decision the offspring would take.
15I expect that low-ability children receive a greater share of the loan in terms of financial transfers.
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The empirical counterpart is taken from Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2a, who study
data from the NLSY79. Figure 1.4 shows their results. I find that - both in the model and in
the data - college enrolment increases with ability level. In the model, this is an immediate
consequence of the assumption that more able children have a higher likelihood to graduate
from college, which makes college investment more profitable for their parents.
These plots also indicate a subsidiary, but quantitatively important role for family in-
come in accounting for college entry, which one might think of as indicating the importance
of borrowing constraints. In an influential paper, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) claim that
enrolment gaps with respect to family income are not very informative about the strength
of borrowing constraints. They argue that one needs to distinguish between short-term bor-
rowing constraints, which are created by short-term cash-flow problems when a child is on
the threshold of college enrolment, and long-term borrowing constraints related to a family’s
ability to finance education through a youth’s childhood. Only the short-term constraints are
of relevance for public policy in my framework, as they can be addressed directly with policy
measures such as a different college subsidy scheme. Family income, which is measured when
the child is on the threshold of college entry, thus captures short-term as well as long-term
constraints.
Carneiro and Heckman control for long-term factors by including parental education and
a set of other family related variables in addition to a measure of academic ability when
computing the enrolment gaps. They find that gaps in college entry by family income narrow
significantly after controlling for long-run borrowing constraints (see Figure 5 in their paper).
In Table 1.5, I report the enrolment gaps with respect to the highest income quartile
generated by the baseline economy. Each column represents a different ability quartile. Panel
A of Table 1.5 documents the enrolment gaps corresponding to Figure 1.3. Panel B and C give
the enrolment gaps after controlling for the parental education level (high school or college,
respectively).
In line with Carneiro and Heckman (2002), I find that enrolment gaps narrow after con-
trolling for long-term factors, in my case ability and parental schooling. Table 1.5 reveals that
enrolment gaps for children from college graduated parents differ very little across different
income groups.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) interpret these enrolment gaps as the fraction of the popu-
lation that cannot attend college because of financial constraints. They conclude that at most
8 percent of the population is constrained in their college decision. I repeat their analysis and
weight the enrolment gaps documented in Table 1.5 with the fraction of the total population
in the respective ability and income quartile. I find that the maximum fraction constrained
is 14 percent if I condition on high school education (Panel B) and 11 percent if I control for
college education (Panel C). Without controlling for education, the estimated share would
have been considerably higher (20 percent, panel A) which confirms that incorporating long-
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term factors decreases the conjectured role of borrowing constraints, as argued by Carneiro
and Heckman (2002).
Above I argued that removing the borrowing constraint for college enrolment leads to an
18 percent increase in the enrolment rate. Thus, the model-based estimate of the extent to
which borrowing constraints adversely affect college entry is substantially higher than the
econometric estimate derived from controlling for long-term factors. I will now show that this
disparity is due to imperfect altruism on the part of parental households which implies that
young and able households may receive insufficient transfers even if their parents could afford
to send them to college.
The Role of Imperfect Altruism
In order to gauge the importance of imperfect altruism, I repeat the experiment from Section
1.6.1 but let parents decide how to spend the additional resources provided by the government.
Thus, comparing this experiment to the ’forced’ experiment reported in Table 2.3, allows me
to check how imperfect altruism affects the extent of borrowing constraints for prospective
college entrants. I will refer to this experiment as ’free disposal’. The fact that parents are
imperfectly altruistic implies that parents weight the disutility the child suffers from repaying
the loan less than their utility gain they obtain by using part of the loan for their own
consumption purposes. I thus expect that parents do not provide the total loan amount to
their children.16 The ’free disposal’ experiment therefore mainly illustrates the extend to
which imperfect altruism biases our measured fraction of constrained families.
Table 2.3 reports the total share of students that engage in college education. I find that
the fraction of college students in each cohort increase from 57 percent to 62 percent when I
allow for borrowing. Compared to the increase of 18 percent that one could observe in the
’forced’ experiment above, this share appears to be relatively small.
In order to understand the differences, it is interesting to compare the Figures 1.3, 1.5
and 1.6. I find that in the experiment with ’forced’ credit (Figure 1.6), the enrolment rates
increase not only for households from the lower end of the income distribution, but also
for rich households. I do not observe this pattern in the ’free-disposal’ experiment (Figure
1.5), which suggest that enrolment rates rise because the ’forced’ experiment eliminates all
effects of imperfect altruism. Hence, ignoring the possibility of imperfect altruism may bias
the estimated fraction of constrained households downwards. The results show that, even
though the average enrolment gap measured in the model is in line with empirical results
by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), the true fraction of constrained households is much larger
as even children from high-income family may not receive the sufficient amount of transfers
needed to go to college.
16Because of imperfect capital markets, parents might also be borrowing constrained for their own consump-
tion purposes. Since parents are already in an advanced stage of the life cycle when transfers take place, I do
not expect constraints on parental consumption to be binding for a larger fraction of families.
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The Role of Parental Education as a Long-Run Factor
Conditioning on parental education has a significant impact on observable enrolment pat-
terns, implying that there is a strong link between parental education and children’s college
attendance. Apart from the fact that college graduated parents are richer, they also have, by
assumption, smarter children.
However, Table 1.6 documents that even after controlling for ability and family income
quartile, offspring from college educated families have a 4.5 percent higher change of being
enrolled in college than descendants from high school educated families (Table 1.6, first row).
This difference stems from the fact that education not only determines the level of family
income but also the level of parental wealth. In the empirical literature, family income is
usually solely observed in a specific year. Wealth in turn is determined by permanent income,
which may only be weakly related to the level of income around college age.
The second row of Table 1.6 accounts for this effect. Here, I compute the average difference
between the enrolment rates of college graduates and high school graduates, controlling for
the quartile of family income, ability and assets. The results of the first and the second
row are extremely similar, suggesting that differences in asset holdings - after controlling for
family income - do not explain the gap in college enrolment between children of differently
educated parents.
The findings contribute to the debate in the literature on whether parental education
should be used as a measure for long-term borrowing constraints (Carneiro and Heckman
(2002), Kane (2006)). To the extent that parents can help financing their children’s education
with current income or accumulated assets, conditioning on parental education may lead to
an understatement of the role of short-term constraints (Kane 2006, p. 1394). The results
suggest that this is not the case; parental education seems to have an influence on college
going, which is independent of the wealth effect.
Neither differences in parental endowment nor differences in children’s ability explain fully
why high school educated parents provide less support for their offspring’s college education.
Instead, the differences stem from different expectations about the future. High school grad-
uates are exposed to a higher earnings risk and lower average earnings, even after the time
their children left home. Indeed, I find that high school graduates have higher savings than
college graduates at age 53, the age at which parent households decide about transfers.
In Tables 1.7 and 1.8, I compute average savings for different ability, income and wealth
quartiles, differentiated by the education level of the household. The results convey a clear
message: high school graduates at age 53 tend to save more than college graduates at this
age.
Thus, in conclusion, I find that large fraction of borrowing constrained households mea-
sured in my model compared to the literature can be explained by (i) the fact that parents
are imperfectly altruistic, which implies that even children from high-income families may
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not receive enough parental funding and (ii) the high school educated parents save more and
transfer less than their college educated counterparts, even if their children are equally well
prepared for college.
1.6.2 Economy 2000: Have borrowing constraints become more limiting?
Have Borrowing Constraints Become more Limiting?
In order to analyze to what extent borrowing constraints have become more binding as the
economic environment changed between 1980 and 2000, I repeat the ’free-disposal’ as well as
the ’forced’ experiment for the 2000 economy. The ’free-disposal’ experiment for the economy
2000 indicates that the share of college students increases from 60 percent to 85 percent,
which is a change of 25 percentage points (see Table 2.3). This result is in stark contrast to
the result for the economy 1980, for which enrolment increased by only 5 percentage points.
Comparison of the college enrolment rates for the two different economies, see Figures
1.5 and 1.9 reveals that the low-ability students make the difference. While these agents’
college enrolment decisions are approximately unaffected by the provision of loans in the 1980
economy, this policy increases their enrolment rates significantly in the 2000 economy. This
indicates that – due to the increase in the college premium – college education becomes more
profitable for this group of students. As indicated by the enrolment patterns in the previous
section, only rich parents are willing to take advantage of this and invest in their low-ability
children. Despite the surge in the college premium, parents with lower income, instead, do
not find it advantageous to transfer sufficient funds to their offspring.
Applying the ’forced’ credit experiment to the economy 2000 reveals the full extent to
which lack of parental transfers (and thus borrowing constraints) limit college enrolment. In
this alternative experiment, enrolment goes up to approximately 100 percent. That is, around
40 percent of the population are constrained in their college decision, compared to 18 percent
in the economy 1980.17
Thus, the recent changes in the economic environment in the U.S. generate a larger fraction
of constrained households. In order to understand why, I present the changes in the enrolment
patterns between 1980 and 2000 in the next section.
Enrolment Rates
I now analyze to what extend the increase in the college premium, the tuition fees and the
variance of the productivity process have affected the college enrolment for different ability
17It is also interesting to note that the model implies that the share of students who drop out from college
without a degree increased, albeit only slightly, when one compares the baseline economy to the economy 2000.
This rise is an immediate consequence of the fact that the share of low-ability students increased. The findings
thus provide an explanation for the changing dynamic between college enrolment and college completion, which
is documented by Turner (2004). See Table 2.3
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and family income quartiles. Figure 1.7 shows the enrolment rates obtained from our model
economy 2000, while the empirical counterpart from the NLSY97 is displayed in Figure 1.8
(see Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2b). In line with their observations, I find that the
role of ability did not change with respect to the economy 1980. Also consistent with the
data, there are two striking differences between the economies of 1980 and 2000:
1. Enrolment rates are higher for the economy 2000. This suggests that in the aggregate,
the rise in the rate of return on tertiary education more than outweighs the increase in
risk and the higher price of tuition.
2. Enrolment gaps between different family income groups have widened over time, in
particular for the low-ability students. This holds even after controlling for parental
education (see Table 1.10).
To better understand the increase in the enrolment gap for low-ability students, I compute
the share of college students from the lowest ability for the economy 1980 and the economy
2000. I find that this fraction has more than doubled from 1.8 percent to 5 percent (see Table
2.3). This increase could indicate that the number of high income families with low ability
children rose since high income families are more prone to send their offspring to college.
However, our results reveal that the number of families from the top income quartile that
have children with low ability actually declined from 2.4 to 1.3 percent. Consequently, the
rise of the fraction of low-ability college students must be due to the increase in the college
premium which made college investment more attractive, even for low-ability students.
Next, I compute the average savings for different income, wealth and ability quartiles, us-
ing the policy functions and the steady-state distribution of agents generated by our economy
2000 for agents at age 53. The results are shown in Tables 1.10 and 1.11. If I compare the
difference between high school and college graduates for 1980 (tables 1.7 and 1.8) with the
differences in 2000, I find that high school graduated parents now save even more compared
to their college graduated counterparts, all other things equal. The increase appears to be
more pronounced for parents with children in the lowest ability quartile.
Strikingly, savings of high school graduates relative to college graduates increases, after
controlling income and wealth. This is due to the increase in the variance of earnings shocks,
which I use in order to simulate the increment in the within-group inequality. This rise in
uncertainty has a stronger impact on high school graduates, as labor earnings comprise a
bigger share of total income for that group. Therefore, the need for precautionary savings is
higher for the high school group, which causes them to keep more resources to secure their
own future. This result is reinforced by the fact that high school graduated parents are
more likely to have low-ability children, which reduces the expected return from investing. In
addition, the rise in tuition fees has made college expenses even more expensive, reducing the
incentives for the poor to invest in their children.
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In conclusion, I find that the recent changes in the economic environment generate a
stronger link between family income and college enrolment in the model, which is in line with
the data. The model predicts that financial constraints have become more limiting over the
course of time. In the model, this stems from the fact that the rise in the college premium
implies that more young household are willing to go to college. Only the rich parents, however,
can take advantage of this and invest. The others are hampered by the increase in within-
group inequality, which requires more savings for their own future, and the increment of the
tuition fees.
1.6.3 Testable Implications
A key insight from the analysis above is that, according to my model, parents at age 53 with
high school education save more and transfer less to their offspring than college graduates
at the same age. I will now examine to empirical relevance of this aspect of my analysis. I
address this issue by computing education specific savings and transfers from the 1986 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF).
The Trade-Off between Transfers and Savings in the Data
The SCF is a household survey conducted on a triennial basis. It consists of a cross-section
of U.S. households, with the exception of the waves in 1983 and 1986 which contain repeated
cross-sections. This allows me to observe household savings between 1983 and 1986. Moreover,
the 1986 wave also ask extensively about household’s transfer behavior, and has therefore
become a standard reference with respect to parental inter-vivos transfers (see e.g. Gale and
Scholz (1994)). I compute total transfers given by a household as the sum of all monetary
transfers and college expenses, which are reported separately in the SCF.18 I use savings
in constant prices accumulated between 1983 and 1986. In order to be consistent with the
model, I only consider those households that are between 45 and 65 years old, and that
have at least one child. As Table 1.12 shows, college graduates have on average higher
savings and transfer more resources (column 1), as one would expect from the fact that
college graduates are on average more aﬄuent and have higher income than high school
graduates. However, if I introduce dummies for the asset quartile and the income quartile
in order to control for wealth and income effects, I find that college graduates make more
transfers, but they save considerably less than high school educated parents.19 In line with the
predictions of the model, this suggests that there is trade-off between savings and transfers,
and that the split between the two is also determined by expectations about the future.
This finding has important implications for the design of college subsidy rules. Dynarski
18The 1986 SCF only reports transfers if the transfer amount is above 3000 US-Dollar.
19The 1986 SCF does not include any measure for the academic ability of the offspring. However, one can
show that the key predictions of Tables 1.7 and 1.8, still holds, even if one controls only for income and wealth
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and Scott-Clayton (2006) and Kane (2006) argue that part of the enrolment gap can be
explained by the complexity of existing system of distributing federal student aid, which
disproportionately burdens youth from low-income and low-education families. They propose
to implement simple, easily communicable aid programs. My results extend their argument:
because financial aid is determined solely on the basis of actual family wealth and income, it
adversely affects students from low-income families. Instead, college aid should also be based
on expected future earnings.
The Drop in the Degree of Education Persistence
Another model implication that deserves further attention can be seen in Table 2.3. In the
last column, I document the intergenerational correlation of educational attainment for the
different economies. Interestingly, the results indicate that the degree of education persistence
decreased as one moves from the economy 1980 to the economy 2000. This is perhaps sur-
prising as the literature generally assumes that borrowing constraints lead to a higher degree
of persistence, not the other way round (see Keane and Wolpin (2001), among others).
The fact that the link between parents and children in educational achievement weakened
over time can also be seen from Table 1.6. Comparing the first and the second column,
one finds that the role of parental education in predicting college entry declined over time,
after controlling for ability, parental wealth and income. This is in line with recent empirical
evidence. Both Ellwood and Kane (2000) and Belley and Lochner (2007), Table 3, show that
the correlation of parental education and children’s college attendance declined over time.
They also include a proxy for academic ability in the regression, and control for the parental
wealth and income quartile.
The decrease in the role of parental education in predicting college access stems from the
fact that more high school educated parents are among the group that are able to afford to
send their children to college. While the fraction of high school graduated parents that were
either in the top three income quartiles and in the top three wealth quartiles of all parents
was 53 percent in 1980, this fraction increased to 56 percent in 2000. This effect must be
due to the increase in the instability of earnings, which raises wealth inequality among high
school graduates.
This shows that the rise in precautionary savings can simultaneously explain the increase
in the number of constrained households and the decline in the degree of the intergenerational
persistence of education. On the one hand, precautionary savings decrease the willingness of
parents to transfer resources to their offspring, leading to a greater fraction of constrained
children. On the other hand, the increment in savings throughout the life cycle increases the
fraction of high school graduated parents that possesses the necessary amount of resources to
invest, which weakens the intergenerational correlation of education.
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1.7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the role of borrowing constraints in determining
college enrolment. I also address the question to what extend the quantitative importance of
borrowing constraints has changed over time. I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model
with overlapping generations, in which households are organized into dynasties. Because of
market incompleteness, borrowing against future earnings is not possible, which allows me to
measure the fraction of households constrained in their college decision. Young households
need to rely on parental transfers and public subsidies if they wish to attend college. A key
feature is the assumption that parents provide transfers to their children because of altruism,
that is, they consider their children’s utility in their own maximization problem.
I calibrate the model such that it is consistent with key parameters of the U.S. economy.
Once I increase the college premium, the tuition fees and the earnings inequality in order to
simulate changes in the economic environment that occurred between 1980 and 2000, I find
that the model is consistent with a rise in the enrolment gaps by levels of family income that
are observed in the U.S. data (Belley and Lochner (2007)).
The assumption of one-sided altruism implies that parents face a trade-off between making
transfers and saving resources for future consumption, since the parent households have no
access to the future returns of the college investment. I find that the transfer flows generated
by the model imply that parents are imperfectly altruistic. That is, parents weight their
children’s utility less than their own. From the point of view of a parent household, this
lowers the expected return from investing in their children’s education. I find that even
children with rich parents may thus be constrained in their college going decision.
The model also predicts that - all other things equal - high school educated parents transfer
less to their children and save more for their own future consumption than college educated
parents. In the model, this is due to the fact that high school graduates foresee lower future
earnings and higher uncertainty about the actual realization of the earnings process than
college graduates. This forces them to save more to secure their own future consumption.
I test this prediction using transfer and savings data from the 1986 Survey of Consumer
Finances. The results support the predictions of the model: high school graduates transfer
less and save more than their college educated counterparts, after controlling for wealth and
income.
The model predicts that in 1980, before the economic changes occurred, around 18 percent
of all households are financially constrained in their college decision. This is in sharp contrast
to empirical evidence based on the NLSY79, which finds that the fraction of constrained
households is at most 8 percent (Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). My results show that
narrow enrolment gaps (after controlling for long-term factors) are consistent with a large
fraction of households constrained in their college decision.
The model further predicts that the share of families that are financially constrained in
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their college decision has risen dramatically over time. I document that this stems from
the fact that the profitability of college education for low-ability students increased, but
their parental willingness to provide resources did not keep pace with that. Parents with
lower education levels, who are more severely affected by the increase in the within-group
inequality, need more resources to secure their own future and are therefore not willing to
provide more financial assistance. Again, this result stresses the importance of considering
the determinants of parental transfers for analyzing college enrolment patterns.
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1.8 Appendix: Solution Algorithm
I solve the quantitative model using a nested fixed point algorithm with a successive approx-
imation to the value function at its center. The outer loop searches for a fixed point in the
interest rate, while the inner loop solves the dynamic program given by (1.6) - (1.16) using
successive approximation to the value function. Notice that the inner loop is necessary be-
cause the hybrid model nests both the pure life cycle economy and a model with infinitely
lived dynasties as special cases: the parental value function (1.21) contains the discounted
future utility of the child and vice versa. I start with a guess for the parental value function,
V ′p,1, solve the child’s problem (1.9), giving V ′p,1 and compute an update for (1.21),V ′′p,1. I
continue iterating over (1.21)until convergence is achieved.
1.8.1 Approximating the Value Function
The model economy contains up to two continuous state variables, namely own assets and
parents assets, the latter only if parents are alive. 20 Approximating the value function by
means of discretization thus proves to be infeasible. Instead, I compute a linear approximation
to the value function. I start with a discrete approximation D to the continuum of all possible
asset holdings, {d1,d2, ...dm} ≡ D. The value function is computed at all di ∈D. By means of a
simple grid search, I pick that element that gives the highest value of the value function, which
I call di∗ . The maximum is bracketed by di∗−1 and di∗+1. To compute the optimal savings
decision, I perform a golden section search on the interval spanned by the two boundary values.
In-between values are computed by linear interpolation using di∗−1, di∗+1 and di∗ . For young
agents with living parents, I span a two dimensional grid and use bi-linear interpolation.
This procedure has the advantage that is does not require the value function to be dif-
ferentiable. Non-differentiabilities may arise because college investment is discretionary. In
model period j = 31, only parents who are rich enough invest in their offspring’s education,
which induces a kink in the parental value function. This may also lead to convex parts in
the curvature of the value function. Concavity, however, is a necessary prerequisite for the
golden section search, which guarantees that the procedure actually picks a global maximum.
We achieve convexification by making the process of college skill accumulation probabilis-
tic. In addition, parents do not only use education investment but also financial transfers in
order to transfer resources across generations. Because financial transfers are perfectly divisi-
ble, they contribute to convexifying the parental value function. Intuitively, the divisibility of
financial transfers allows parents to balance the total amount of resources transferred to the
child. If college investment becomes profitable from a certain wealth level onwards, financial
transfers are reduced, which causes the value function to increase only slightly. This helps to
smooth out the kink introduced by the discrete nature of college investments.
20Since we approximate the income process with a Markov chain, all other state variables are discrete.
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Figure 1.2: Interpolated value function for different levels of household wealth, after control-
ling for education, productivity and children’s ability shock
The same argument applies to the savings of a parent household in model period j = 31.
Parental savings increment parental wealth holdings, which are part of the child household’s
state space. Because parents decide about savings, monetary transfers and college investment
simultaneously given their budget constraint in j = 31, investing in college thus reduces their
savings and decreases the child households utility.
In total, when computing the approximation to the value function, I find that appears to
be concave, as graph 1.2 shows. 21
Since the state space involves two continuous variables for the case of agents with living
parents, this procedure requires a bilinear interpolation. While linear interpolation is shape
preserving, bilinear interpolation is generally not, as outlined in Judd (1998), Ch. 6. In order
to avoid potential drawbacks of using an interpolation scheme which is not shape preserving,
I use the fact that one of the continuous state variables is exogenously given. That is, when
the policy functions for young agents are computed, their parental capital stock is fixed, and
I compute a′j(a
1, ap, ..), a′j(a
2, ap, ..), ..., by iterating over the capital grid. This implies that
while computing the maximum, I only interpolate in one dimension and the problem remains
concave. In order to save computation time, I exploit the fact that the value function is
monotone increasing function of assets.
21This is not due to the approximation procedure, as linear interpolation is shape preserving.
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1.8.2 Computation of the Equilibrium
Using the policy functions which were computed previously, I can now solve for the equilibrium
allocation. Computing an equilibrium involves the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters, that is, determine the social security replacement rate
rep, the tax rate for capital income τk and a college subsidy rule ν.
2. Provide an initial guess for the aggregate (physical) capital stock K0, the aggregate
human capital stock H0 and the labor tax rate τw. Given the guesses for K and H, use
the first-order conditions from the firms problem to obtain the relative factor prices r
and w.
3. Compute the optimal decision rules as outlined in the previous section.
4. Compute the time invariant measure Φ of agents over the state space.
5. Compute the aggregate asset holdings K1 and the new human capital stock L1 using
(1.30) and (1.31). Given K1 and L1, update r, w and τw.
6. If m = max(
(
K1−K0
K1
, L1−L0L1
)
< 10−3 stop; otherwise return to step 2 and replace K0
with K1 and L0 with L1.
In step 4, I find the time-invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate
law of motion as defined in (1.36), as it is commonly done in models with an infinite time
horizon. In the model, the measure of parents in their fist period of adulthood depends on
the transition of children (because all parents were children one period before). In turn,
the measure of children in their first period of life depends on the measure of their parents
(because children receive transfers and education). Stationarity requires that the probability
measure is constant over time. This implies that, for a given measure of parents, the measure
of children exactly reproduces the measure of their own parents.
I approximate the measure of agents by means of a probability density function. 22 The
density function is computed and stored on a finite set of grid points. Following R´ıos-Rull and
of Minneapolis Research Dept (1997), I choose a grid Ddensity which is finer than the one used
in the previous step for computing the decision rules, that is D ⊆ Ddensity. Choosing a finer
grid for the density increases the precision with which the aggregate variables are computed,
since the optimal asset choices are continuous.23 Thus, the optimal choice will almost surely
22Heer and Maußner (2005) argue that approximating the time-invariant measure of agents with the help
of a density function saves up to 40 percent of the CPU time with respect to an approximation using the
distribution. This is because computing the distribution function requires to compute the inverse of the policy
function.
23The gains in precision (as measured by aggregate excess demand) by doing so are enormous. The reason
is that the aggregate good market clearing condition is just a weighted average of the individuals’ budget
constraints, where the weights are derived from the grid points of the density Φ. The finer the grid in Φ, the
better will be the correspondence between the optimal policies and the resulting weights, leading to better
aggregation results.
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be off-grid. In order to map the optimal choices onto the grid, we introduce some kind of
lottery. An individual with asset choice a′(.) ∈ (ai, ai+1) is interpreted as choosing asset
holdings ai with probability λ and asset holdings ai+1 with probability (1−λ) where λ solves
a′(.) = λai + (1−λ)ai+1. No lottery is needed for agents for which the lower bounds on asset
holdings is binding, which is the case for a positive fraction of the population. I thus allocate
the grid points such that there closer mashed in the neighborhood of the lower bound. This is
achieved by choosing a grid points which are equally spaced in logarithms. I select the upper
bound of Ddensity and D such that it is never found to be binding.
I find the time invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law of motion
as defined in (1.36). Φ is is only stored on a finite grid, an individual with choice a′(.)
∈ (ai, ai+1) is interpreted to choose asset holdings ki with probability λ and asset holdings
ki+1 with probability (1 − λ) where λ solves a′(.) = λai + (1 − λ)ai+1. That is, we compute
a piecewise linear approximation to the density function.
The forward recursion starts with an initial distribution of young agents in model period
j = 1, Φ1(A×Pr×Ap×E×{1}). This requires an initial guess for the distribution of parents
in model period j = 31. Using decision rule, one can then derive Φ1(A×Pr ×Ap×E ×{1}).
In stationary equilibrium, this distribution needs to be identical with Φ31(A × Pr × {j =
31}), the distribution of agents in model period j = 36. Following Heer (2001), a uniform
distribution is taken as an initial guess for Φ31(A × Pr × {j = 31}). The age-independent
time-invariant distribution is computed using the decision rules derived from (1.6)-(1.16),
where Φ31(A× Pr × {j = 31}) is updated until convergence.
As a check on the internal consistency, aggregate consumption, investment, transfers and
output are computed in order to ensure that the good market clearing condition (1.32) is
approximately satisfied.24
24Excess supply is typically less than 0.4% of total output.
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1.9 Appendix: Graphs
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Figure 1.3: Enrolment Rates 1980
Figure 1.4: Enrolment Rates NLSY79 (Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2a)
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Figure 1.5: Enrolment Rates Economy 1980, parents borrow.
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Figure 1.6: Enrolment Rates Economy 1980, children borrow
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Figure 1.7: Enrolment Rates 2000
Figure 1.8: Enrolment Rates NLSY97 (Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2b)
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Figure 1.9: Enrolment Rates Economy 2000, parents borrow.
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1 2 3 4
Ability
Income Quartile 1 Income Quartile 2
Income Quartile 3 Income Quartile 4
Figure 1.10: Enrolment Rates Economy 2000, children borrow.
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1.10 Appendix: Tables
Parameter Description Value
α capital share of income 0.36
δ capital depreciation rate 0.08
γ risk aversion 1.5
ρhs earnings persistence high school 0.946
σhs variance shocks 0.015
ρcol earnings persistence college 0.955
σcol variance shocks 0.010
τK capital income tax rate 0.2
rep replacement ratio pensions 0.4
Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters with Direct Empirical Counterpart for ’Economy 1980’
Parameter Description Value Target Target Value
β discount factor 0.963 Wealth/Income 3.0
κ cost of college 0.94 % coll. graduates 25
college completion rate corresponding
d
for low-ability students
0.32
target in NLSY79
0.3
increment of college overall college
a
completion with ability
0.07
completion rate
0.5
transmission intergenerational
pi
initial productivity
0.83
education persistence
0.3
τw labor income tax 0.15 budget balanced –
ς intergen. discounting 0.7 financial transfers/wealth 0.028
ν0 upper bound coll. subsidy 0.57 upper bound in data 0.5
ν1 slope coll. subsidy 0.1 coll. subsidies/coll. expenses 0.4
Table 1.2: Parameters Without Direct Empirical Counterpart
Parameter Description Value 1980 2000
σhs variance shocks 0.015 0.025
σcol variance earnings shocks 0.01 0.016
κ cost of college 0.94 2.13
Table 1.3: Parameters characterizing the Economy 2000
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Table 1.4: Enrolment Characteristics for Different Economies
Economy % enrolled % drop out % low ability % corr. edu
1980 57 55 1.8 0.30
’free-disposal’ 62 55 1.3 0.28
’forced’ 75 56 8 0.22
2000 60 56 5 0.28
’free disposal’ 85 57 16 0.18
’forced’ 99 58 25 0.10
Notes: The Table shows the total enrolment rate, the total drop-out rate, the fraction of
college students from the lowest ability quartile, and the intergenerational persistence of
college education
Table 1.5: Enrolment Gaps with Respect to the Top Income Quartile for Different Ability
Quartiles, Economy 1980
Ability Quart. 1 Ability Quart. 2 Ability Quart. 3 Ability Quart. 4
Panel A – All Parents
income 4-1 0.29 0.61 0.55 0.28
income 4-2 0.29 0.33 0.09 0.005
income 4-3 0.24 0.22 0.003 0
Panel B – High School Educated Parents
income 4-1 0.23 0.45 0.54 0.28
income 4-2 0.23 0.18 0.1 0.007
income 4-3 0.18 0.09 0.002 -0.002
Panel C – College Educated Parents
income 4-1 – – – –
income 4-2 0.86 0.06 -0.002 0
income 4-3 0.79 0.06 0 0
Notes: Enrolment gaps are computed for different ability quartiles, without controlling for parental education
(panel A), only for children with high-school graduates parents (panel B) and for children with college graduated
parents (panel C). An entry for ’income 4-1’ of 0.29 indicates that the enrolment rate in the lowest income
quartile is about 30 percentage points below the enrolment rate of the highest income quartile. A missing entry
(–) indicates that there are no children with parents in this category.
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Table 1.6: Difference in College Enrolment Rates of College Graduated Parents vs. High
School Graduated Parents
Economy 1980 Economy 2000
(a) 4.5 2.3
(b) 4.3 2
Notes: In (a), I control for the ability and income quartile
and in (b) for ability, income and the wealth quartile. A value
of ’4.5’ indicates that within this group, children with college
educated parents are 4.5 percent more likely to enrol in college
than youth from high school educated families.
Table 1.7: Economy 1980: Average savings of high school graduates (model period j = 31),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 1.66 1.59 1.50 1.43
Income 2 2.0 1.90 1.69 1.61
Income 3 2.27 2.17 2.08 2.08
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 2 Income 1 3.19 3.09 2.92 2.77
Income 2 3.51 3.27 3.05 3.05
Income 3 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 3 Income 1 4.63 4.63 4.51 4.27
Income 2 4.51 4.29 4.08 4.08
Income 3 4.97 4.85 4.80 4.92
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 4 Income 1 5.20 5.20 5.20 5.20
Income 2 6.55 6.55 6.56 6.57
Income 3 6.94 6.87 6.88 7.05
Income 4 8.69 8.65 8.72 9.01
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Table 1.8: Economy 1980: Average savings of college graduates (model period j = 31), con-
trolling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 1.81 1.52 1.50 1.50
Income 3 2.01 1.94 1.93 1.93
Income 4 2.09 2.16 2.19 2.20
Wealth 2 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 2.62 2.28 2.26 2.26
Income 3 3.23 2.95 3.02 3.07
Income 4 2.53 3.11 3.39 3.52
Wealth 3 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 4.33 4.27 4.26 4.26
Income 4 3.69 4.27 4.53 4.85
Wealth 4 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 5.53 5.53 5.77 5.90
Income 4 7.06 7.22 7.50 8.10
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Table 1.9: Enrolment Gaps with Respect to the Top Income Quartile for Different Ability
Quartiles, Economy 2000
Ability Quart. 1 Ability Quart. 2 Ability Quart. 3 Ability Quart. 4
Panel A – All Parents
income 4-1 0.78 0.81 0.61 0.36
income 4-2 0.67 0.45 0.09 0.03
income 4-3 0.59 0.33 0.01 0
Panel B – High School Educated Parents
income 4-1 0.72 0.72 0.60 0.36
income 4-2 0.62 0.36 0.09 0.03
income 4-3 0.54 0.27 0.01 -0.002
Panel C – College Educated Parents
income 4-1 – – – –
income 4-2 – – – –
income 4-3 0.12 0.007 0 0
Notes: Enrolment gaps are computed for different ability quartiles, without controlling for parental education
(panel A), only for children with high-school graduates parents (panel B) and for children with college graduated
parents (panel C). An entry for ’income 4-1’ of 0.29 indicates that the enrolment rate in the lowest income
quartile is about 30 percentage points below the enrolment rate of the highest income quartile. A missing entry
(–) indicates that there are no children with parents in this category.
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Table 1.10: Economy 2000: Average savings of high school graduates (model period j = 31),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 1.78 1.71 1.55 1.34
Income 2 2.16 2.02 1.75 1.44
Income 3 2.39 2.11 1.79 1.67
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 2 Income 1 3.61 3.16 2.78 2.83
Income 2 4.24 3.75 3.31 3.31
Income 3 4.17 3.68 3.35 3.57
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 3 Income 1 5.48 5.14 4.82 4.82
Income 2 5.35 4.96 4.61 4.64
Income 3 5.82 5.44 5.30 5.72
Income 4 - - - -
Wealth 4 Income 1 6.68 6.27 5.90 5.90
Income 2 7.58 7.43 7.44 7.82
Income 3 7.95 7.75 7.79 8.26
Income 4 10.48 10.47 10.59 10.95
Table 1.11: Economy 2000: Average savings of college graduates (model period j = 31),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 1.64 1.61 1.61 1.61
Income 4 1.42 1.80 1.93 1.99
Wealth 2 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 2.67 3.09 3.12 3.17
Income 4 2.81 3.24 3.42 3.64
Wealth 3 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 4.27 4.83 4.87 5.31
Income 4 4.40 4.97 5.03 5.53
Wealth 4 Income 1 - - - -
Income 2 - - - -
Income 3 5.20 5.85 5.90 6.48
Income 4 7.85 8.52 8.66 9.14
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Table 1.12: Average Savings and Transfers of High School and College Graduates (in 1983
US-Dollar)
no controls controls
High School 14200 92334Savings
College 92200 81953
High School 1330 7725Transfers
College 11900 11100
Notes: All values are obtained through an OLS regression of savings or transfers on
a set set of dummy variables. The first column only controls for the education level,
while the second column also includes dummies for the wealth and income level.
The results in the second column are predicted values for a household in the third
income percentile the fourth wealth percentile. Regressions are weighted using the
SCF frequency weights. All results are statistically significant at the 5% level
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Chapter 2
Why Do the Rich Save More? The
Role of Housing
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I analyze the determinants of the wealth-income gradient with educational
attainment that is observable in the data. This gradient is very steep: using the 1989 wave of
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), I find the median college graduates near retirement
age holds twice as much wealth (total net worth) as the median high school dropout.
Understanding the determinants of the wealth-income gap between two education groups
is interesting for the following reason. The highest education level achieved by the household
head can be seen as a proxy for the level of labor income along the life cycle.1 The fact that
wealth-income ratios near retirement are increasing with the educational attainment of the
household head then implies that the income-rich hold disproportionately more wealth near
retirement age, relative to their income. This is a puzzle with respect to the standard life cycle
model, in which preferences are homothetic and homogenous across the population (Dynan
et al. (2004)). Thus, understanding the wealth-income gradient is crucial for understanding
the main determinants of wealth and income inequality.
The key point of this paper is to argue that when housing is introduced into the standard
life cycle model of savings, the standard model can account for the wealth-income gradient
that is observable in the data.
The inclusion of housing is motivated by the observation that when I control for housing in
the 1989 SCF, a substantial part of the wealth-income gap disappears. Moreover, the fraction
of households that own their home is substantially higher among better educated households.
In order to shed more light on the role of housing, I set up a computable life cycle model.
Markets are incomplete, and household face idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Households receive
utility from the consumption of housing services and non-housing consumption. Housing ser-
vices can be acquired on the rental market or through owner-occupied housing. Importantly,
preferences are homogenous across the population.
I show that a version of this model that is calibrated to match key features of the U.S.
economy can generate a wealth-income gap between the median of two education groups,
namely college graduates and high school dropouts, that is observable in the 1989 SCF.
Housing accounts for a substantial fraction of the observable wealth-income gap between the
two education groups: I find that a share of 25 percent of the total gap is due to the presence
of housing in the model. Strikingly, introducing housing raises the retirement savings of the
median college graduates.
Key for explaining the impact of housing is its interaction with the life cycle earnings
profile of college graduates. In the data, the earnings profile of college graduates depicts a
pronounced hump that peaks around the age 45 (see, e.g. Hubbard et al. (1995)). This pattern
creates incentives to smooth out consumption along the life cycle by borrowing when young
1This has been frequently done in the literature, see for example Hubbard et al. (1995), Attanasio (1999),
Cagetti (2003) or Dynan et al. (2004)
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and accumulating savings for retirement. The dual role of housing as a consumption good
and as collateral for financial debt helps college graduates to obtain a smoother consumption
profile over the life cycle.
As a result, pre-retirement wealth holdings of college graduates increase when housing is
introduced. Because the earnings profile of high school dropouts is relatively flat, the presence
of housing in its function as consumption good, asset and collateral does not have any impact
on pre-retirement wealth holdings. I show that the presence of uninsurable mortality risk
works in the same direction and increases pre-retirement wealth holdings even further.
My paper is related to the previous literature in various dimensions. First, many of the
features of the model can be found in the recent literature that studies the relationship between
housing and wealth accumulation in computable frameworks. Examples include Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2005), who include durables to study the life cycle profiles of durable
and non-durable consumption. Kiyotaki et al. (2007) study the impact of life cycle effects on
house prices. Li and Yao (2007) analyze the impact on changes in house prices on life cycle
savings behavior. Similarly, Yang (2008) analyzes the life cycle profiles of housing and non-
housing consumption. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2008) study bankruptcy and debt portfolios
of secured and unsecured debt in a life cycle framework.
Other papers study housing in frameworks with infinitely lived households. Both Martin
and Gruber (2004) and Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2006) examine the role of housing and
housing market imperfections in generating (cross-sectional) wealth inequality. Hintermaier
and Koeniger (2007) analyze the impact of a spread between the borrowing and lending rate
on durable and non-durable consumption.
All of these papers emphasize the importance of housing and its multiple roles for under-
standing consumption and savings pattern. As an additional contribution to this literature,
I prove analytically that the joint role of housing as a consumption good and as an asset
increases the demand for precautionary savings, compared to the one-asset case in which
households invest in bonds only (see Aiyagari (1994)). I show that this rise occurs even in the
absence of transaction costs, which make housing partially illiquid.A growing literature stud-
ies the consequences of this illiquidity of housing assets on wealth accumulation (see, among
others, Grossman and Laroque (1990), Martin and Gruber (2004), Flavin and Nakagawa
(2004), Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2006), Stokey (2007)).
Second, my results show that a standard life cycle model that is augmented by housing
can generate a wealth-income gradient that is in line with empirical evidence. The model
is standard in the sense that preferences are homogenous and individuals are fully rational.
Cagetti (2003) and Hendricks (2007) find that the heterogeneity in wealth-to-income ratios
is consistent with heterogeneity in time preference rates across different education groups.
Bernheim et al. (2001) argue that that ’rules of thumb’ or other less than fully rational decision
processes, including behavioral rules, are more consistent with the observed heterogeneity
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(also see Dynan et al. (2004)). Guner and Knowles (2007) highlight the role of marital
instability in explaining wealth heterogeneity near retirement age. Scholz and Seshadri (2006)
emphasize the importance of children for household wealth, while Yang (2005) finds that
intergenerational links in terms of bequests are significant.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I provide empirical
evidence from the 1989 SCF. In section 3, I outline the model and provide all proofs. Section
4 presents the calibration. The results are discussed in section 5. Finally, the last section
concludes.
2.2 Wealth Dispersion at Retirement Age: Empirical Evi-
dence
In this section, I use the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances to document that there is a wealth-
income gradient with educational attainment near retirement age. I find that differences in
wealth-to-income ratios are substantial: college graduates have twice as much wealth, relative
to their income, compared to high school dropouts.
2.2.1 Data Description and Construction of Variables
In order to analyze the relationship between wealth and education, I use the 1989 wave
of the SCF. The SCF is conducted on a triennial basis by the Federal Reserve System. Its
primary purpose is to obtain detailed measures of all components of household wealth for U.S.
households, which makes it to one of the major data sources for household wealth (Juster et al.
(1999)). The other major household survey that contains detailed information on household
wealth and earnings, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), underestimates the value
of home equity for all homeowners by 10 percent, compared to the SCF (Juster et al. (1999)).
Juster et al. (1999) also find that the bias between SCF and PSID is increasing in household
wealth.
Because wealth holdings are extremely positively skewed, the SCF combines a represen-
tative area-probability sample with a special over-sample of very high income households
obtained using tax report data. In total, over 4000 households are contained in each cross-
section. To make the statistics more representative for the overall U.S. population, I apply
the SCF replicate weights. For a more detailed description of the SCF, see Bucks et al. (2006)
Wealth and income are defined as in the Federal Reserve Bulletins (see for example Bucks
et al. (2006)).2 In short, the wealth measure comprises financial assets (such as savings
accounts, stock, bonds, individual retirement accounts) and non-financial assets (such as
vehicles, housing) minus liabilities (such as mortgage credit, credit card debt). Respondent’s
2More specifically, all variables are constructed using the SAS program provided by the Federal Reserve:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/bulletin.macro.txt
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retirement accounts are included if they are quasi-liquid and if the respondent can borrow or
make withdrawals.
For my analysis, I use the 1989 SCF which was collected before the surge of housing
prices during the 1990s, which allows me to abstract from the impact of recent housing
market developments on household wealth.3
2.2.2 Wealth-Income Gradient with Education?
In this section, I document that the wealth-income gradient with educational attainment is
steep: near retirement, the median wealth-to-income ratio for college graduates is nearly 4
and thus twice as high as the respective ratio for high school dropouts (table 2.1).
I follow the seminal paper of Dynan et al. (2004) closely, who compute wealth-to-income
ratios for households near retirement using the 1992 SCF and the 1989 PSID.4 They find that
wealth-income ratios are increasing with income (see their Table 9, page 38).
Following their approach, I restrict my analysis to households between age 51 and 61.
This is done for two reasons. First, according to the life cycle hypothesis, agents’ wealth
holdings are highest in the period prior to retirement. Second, it simplifies the treatment
of expectations. When young, wealth is much more affected by expectations about future
earnings shocks (Hendricks (2007)). The wealth-income ratio can then be interpreted as a
’retirement savings’ rate.
I restrict my analysis to the median wealth-income ratios for each education group as the
median is less sensitive to outliers than the mean. This is particularly important because I
use current income in the denominator.
Since the highest education level achieved by the household head is typically constant
over the life cycle and thus not related to temporary income shocks, it proxies lifetime labor
income, see Hubbard et al. (1995), Attanasio (1999), Cagetti (2003) or Dynan et al. (2004).
My finding thus suggest that households with higher levels of lifetime income also hold more
wealth near retirement, relative to their income. This is in line with results from the previous
empirical literature, which finds that the income-rich have disproportionately more wealth
near retirement (see Venti and Wise (2000), Dynan et al. (2004), Hendricks (2007)). Dynan
et al. (2004) show that this is at variance with the standard life cycle model of savings, which
predicts that wealth holdings near retirement are proportional to earnings.
3Sinai and Souleles (2007) document the trends in the life-cycle profiles of net worth and housing equity
over time using the 1983 through 2004 SCF.
4Dynan et al. (2004) also compute savings rates for households with different levels of permanent income,
using various waves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) and the SCF. They find that savings rates are higher for households with a higher level of permanent
income, independently of dataset.
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2.2.3 The Role of Housing
In this section, I argue that there is a tight relationship between housing and the wealth-
income gradient in the U.S. data.
Consider first the differences in the wealth-to-income ratio between homeowners and
renters. For all education levels, near retirement homeowners hold more wealth relative to
their income, see the second column of Table 2.1. The gap between homeowners and renters
is particularly pronounced for high school dropouts: the median wealth-to-income ratio for
renters in this education group is basically zero, while the respective ratio for homeowners is
3.28.
Second, the data also shows that the slope of the wealth-income gradient varies with the
homeownership status. In column 3 of table 2.1, I compute the median wealth-to-income
ratios for homeowners with different education levels. Strikingly, the gap between college
graduates and high school dropouts is reduced to 1.3 when controlling for income, compared
to a value of 2 for the overall population. Considering only homeowners with houses in the
upper half of the distribution reduces the gap somewhat further.
Third, the share of homeowners is increasing with the educational attainment of the
household head, see figure 2.1. Near retirement, almost all college graduates own the home
they live in, while the fraction of high school dropouts that own their home is only about 50
percent.
The empirical evidence presented suggests that modeling housing may be important for
understanding the wealth-income gradient with educational attainment. In the next section,
I will include housing in a life cycle model.
2.3 Theory: Housing, Market Frictions and Wealth
I examine a quantitative life cycle model with idiosyncratic income risk and incomplete mar-
kets, similar to the seminal papers by Huggett (1996) and Huggett and Ventura (2000).
Households derive utility from the consumption of housing services and non-housing con-
sumption. Housing services can be derived from owner-occupied housing or may be acquired
on the rental market. The setup is thus related to a growing literature that implements hous-
ing and its multiple functions in computable life cycle frameworks (see, for example, Gervais
(2002), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), Yang (2006) or Dı´az and Luengo-Prado
(2008), Li and Yao (2007) or Kiyotaki et al. (2007)). In this strand of the literature, housing
serves simultaneously as a consumption good, as an asset to transfer resources across periods
and as collateral for financial loans. Uncollateralized borrowing is not permitted.
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2.4 Economic Environment
The model is a partial equilibrium model where the interest rate is taken to be exogenous,
therefore only the household sector is modeled.
2.4.1 Demographics
The first tw periods of its life, the household receives labor income. Labor supply is inelastic.
Each household lives up to tw + tr = J periods, where tr is the number of periods the agent
is retired. I set tw = 40 and tr = 20. It is assumed that households enter the economy at
the real-life age of 25. Mandatory retirement takes place at the age of 65. Individuals in
each period j < J = 60 have a constant probability of surviving and living in period j + 1. I
denote this probability as αj+1 ∈ [0, 1]. α61 = 0.
2.4.2 Households and Housing Technology
A household of age j derives utility from consumption of a nondurable good, cj , and housing
services sj . Housing services can be acquired through the rental market or through home-
ownership. Households in j = 1 are an exception as they start with zero wealth holdings.
Agents in the first period of life thus have to acquire housing services from the rental market.
The consumption of the non-durable good is continuous as well the consumption of housing
services acquired through renting. In contrast, if households choose to own, they have to
buy at least a home of minimum size h. This assumption ensures that the down-payment
constraint is binding for a positive fraction of the population.
Households Problem
Income
I assume that labor earnings are stochastic. The earnings of a household at age j are given
by ηjej , where ej is the average income and ηj describes the fluctuation around that mean.
In addition to labor earnings, the household receives income from physical capital, accu-
mulated through savings in financial assets. Assets bear an non-stochastic after-tax interest
rate of r. Households also receive transfers tr from the government. As in Hubbard et al.
(1995), I assume that transfers are given by the following specification:
tr = max{0, c− [a(1 + r) + ηjej ]} (2.1)
c is defined as the minimum consumption level guaranteed by the government. Following
the notation of Hubbard et al. (1995), I refer to c as the ’consumption floor’. Transfers are
given by c minus all available resources. Thus, transfer payments reduce one by one for each
dollar of assets or labor earnings. The transfer function thus captures the penalty on savings
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which is implicit in many asset-based, means-tested transfer programs such as AFDC in the
U.S. Hubbard et al. (1995) argue that asset-based means tested transfer are important for
explaining why a substantial fraction of the population does not accumulate any wealth over
their life cycle.
Total available household resources of working households are then given by
a(1 + r) + ηjej + tr
Timing and Information
The timing of events in a given period is as follows. Households observe their idiosyncratic
shock e. Households take their decision about consumption of housing services and the non-
durable good, housing tenure, and eventually savings. I follow the timing convention applied
in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) and assume that housing is not transferred until
the end of the period.5 This implies that even if the household sells its home and uses the
payment to finance other expenditure, it holds the home (and receives utility from the service
flow) until the end of the period. For the same reason, changing house sizes does not influence
the present period service flow. Finally, uncertainty about early death is revealed at the end
of the period.
Working Household’s Problem
The household allocates its resources between the consumption of non-housing goods and
housing services such that total utility is maximized. At age j, the household maximizes
v(ηj , aj , hj , j) = max
cj ,aj+1,hj+1,zj+1,fj
u(cj , sj) + βαj+1∑
ej+1
piej ,ej+1v(ej+1, aj+1, hj+1, j + 1)

(2.2)
such that
5Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) model durable consumption instead of housing.
66
Winter, Christoph (2009), Altruism, Education and Inequality in the United States 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26812
cj + ifj + aj+1 + hj+1 + ν(hj+1, hj , zj+1) = ηjej + (1 + r)aj + (1− δh)hj + tr
sj = (1− zj)fj + zjhj
hj+1 ≥ h
zj+1 = 0 if hj+1 = 0
zj+1 = 1 if hj+1 > 0
cj , fj ≥ 0
aj+1 ≥ −(1− ζ)hj+1
0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1
a1, h1 = 0
j ∈ {1, tw − 1}
Housing services can be acquired through renting or homeownership. zj indicates whether
the household is a homeowner or not. Per unit of rental housing fj , the household pays a
price i. Renting is not restricted, fj ≥ 0. However, owner-occupied housing is bounded from
below by h. If the household changes the tenure status or changes (owner-occupied) housing,
transaction costs ν(hj+1, hj , zj+1) are incurred:
ν(hj+1, hj , zj+1, ψ) =

δhhj hj+1 = hj ∧ zj+1 = 1
κs(1− δh)hj + κbhj+1 hj+1 6= hj ∧ zj+1 = 1
κs(1− δh)hj zj+1 = 0
(2.3)
If housing is not changed, the household is forced to pay for the maintenance of the house.
Otherwise, transaction costs κ occur. Transaction costs are assumed to arise for selling κs
the old home and for buying the new one κb.
The introduction of transaction costs makes housing partially illiquid. A growing liter-
ature studies the consequences of this illiquidity of housing assets on wealth accumulation
(see, among others, Grossman and Laroque (1990), Martin and Gruber (2004), Flavin and
Nakagawa (2004), Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2006), Stokey (2007)).
A homeowner can borrow up to a limit (1 − ζ)hj+1, where ζ specifies the collateral con-
straint. Notice that the down payment requirement is given by ζ, while the maximum loan-
to-value ratio is given by (1− ζ). ζ parametrizes both of these constraints.
Retired Household‘s Problem
The maximization problem of a retired household is similar to the problem of the working
household, with the difference that retired households receive social security benefits pen
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instead of labor income. Hence, income is certain. A retired household’s problem is given by
the Bellman equation:
v(aj , hj , j) = max
cj ,aj+1,hj+1,zj+1,fj
{u(cj , sj) + βαj+1v(aj+1, hj+1, j + 1)} (2.4)
such that
cj + ifj + aj+1 + hj+1 + ν(hj+1, hj , zj+1, ψ) = pen+ (1 + r)aj + (1− δh)hj
sj = (1− zj)fj + zjhj
zj+1 = 0 if hj+1 = 0
zj+1 = 1 if hj+1 ≥ 0
cj , fj ≥ 0
hj+1 ≥ h
aj+1 ≥ −(1− ζ)hj+1
0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1
j ∈ {tw, J − 1}
Because I do not model intended bequests, the continuation value is zero for j = J , which
implies that aJ+1 = hJ+1 = 0.
Transaction costs ν(hj+1, hj , zj+1) are as specified in equation (3.2).
2.4.3 The One-Asset Economy as a Benchmark Case
The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of housing in generating wealth inequality
across earnings groups. In order to evaluate the relative contribution of housing, I compare
the predictions of my model to the classical life cycle framework where households receive
idiosyncratic earnings shocks, borrowing is not permitted and housing is not part of the
utility function. Because the only means of saving is a risk-free bond in this standard setup,
I call this economy the ’one-asset economy’. This model has been studied extensively in the
literature (see, among others, Hubbard et al. (1995), Huggett (1996), Huggett and Ventura
(2000)).
Consider the one-asset economy first. In this economy, households maximize
v(ηj , aj , j) = max
cj ,aj+1
u(cj) + βαj+1∑
ej+1
piej ,ej+1v(ej+1, aj+1, j + 1)
 (2.5)
subject to
cj + aj+1 = ηjej + (1 + r)aj (2.6)
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I argue that the outcome of this economy does not change, even if I allow for housing
services in the utility function but continue to abstract from housing as an asset. In this
economy, housing services have be purchased on the renting market. Therefore, I label this
economy as ’one-asset economy with renting’.
In the one-asset economy with renting, individuals maximize
v(ηj , aj , j) = max
cj ,aj+1,fj
u(cj , sj) + βαj+1∑
ej+1
piej ,ej+1v(ej+1, aj+1, j + 1)
 (2.7)
subject to
cj + ifj + aj+1 = ηjej + (1 + r)aj (2.8)
Assumption 1 The current period utility function U(cj , sj) is twice continuously differen-
tiable
Proposition 2 Let the earnings process in every period j be given by ηjej and let the rental
rate i be constant. Assumption 1 holds. Then, at every age j, asset holdings aj and total
consumption expenditures (cj or cj+ifj, respectively) will identical for the one-asset economies
with and without renting, as given by the optimization problems (2.5) and (2.7).
Proof. I show that the solution to Euler-Equation for non-housing consumption cj does not
depend on sj in the one-asset economy with renting.
The Euler is given by
Uc(cj , sj) = (1 + r)βEj(Uc(cj+1, sj+1)) (2.9)
which is can be written as
Uc(cj , sj)− (1 + r)βEj(Uc(cj+1, sj+1)) = 0 (2.10)
which I label as EE. I show that dEEds = 0, which means
Ucs(cj , sj)− (1 + r)βEj(Ucs(cj+1, sj+1)) = 0 (2.11)
which is the case if
Ucs(cj , sj) = (1 + r)βEj(Ucs(cj+1, sj+1)) (2.12)
The optimal solution to problem 2.7 will also satisfy
Us(cj , sj) = (1 + r)βEj(Us(cj+1, sj+1)) (2.13)
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if the rental price i is constant over time, i.e. it = it+1 which implies that
Usc(cj , sj) = (1 + r)βEj(Usc(cj+1, sj+1)) (2.14)
Under assumption 1, Young’s theorem applies, which states that Usc(cj , sj) = Ucs(cj , sj)
and Ej(Ucs(cj+1, sj+1)) = Ej(Usc(cj+1, sj+1)) at the optimal solution. Hence, at the optimal
solution, condition 2.13 holds and thus also condition 2.11. Therefore, the Euler-Equation
2.9 does not change with s and its solution is valid for any s. Thus, condition 2.9 also holds
for s = 0, which is the optimal solution if s is not part of the utility function, i.e. for problem
2.5. Therefore, the Euler equation for problem 2.5 and problem 2.7 are identical, and thus
also their optimal solution with respect to assets and consumption expenditures.
Remark 3 Proposition 2 holds only if borrowing constraints are not binding.
Intuitively, savings in form of assets (aj) reflects the wish to postpone consumption to
later periods and is thus the result of a trade-off between different periods. As long as prices
are constant, adding housing to the utility function affects only the absolute utility level but
not the trade-off between the utility of different periods.
The impact of housing as an asset on wealth profiles over the life cycle can now be evaluated
by comparing the benchmark economy with the one-asset economy with renting. Proposition
2 ensures me that these results could have also be obtained by using a standard life cycle
model in which housing does not even enter the utility function.
This will prove to be very important in the next section, where I argue that the dual
role of housing as a consumption good and as an asset increases precautionary savings in the
presence of earnings uncertainty.
However, for this to be interesting, it clearly needs to be the case that some households
will prefer to live in owner-occupied housing rather than obtaining housing services on the
rental market. The next section sheds more light on the housing tenure decision, which is an
important trade-off in the model.
2.4.4 Renting Housing Services vs. Owner-Occupied Housing
Assuming that collateral constraints are not binding, the first order condition for housing
assets gives the net costs of owner-occupied housing expressed in units of the consumption
good:
Ej(Uh(cj+1, hj+1))
Ej(Uc(cj+1, hj+1))
= r + δh (2.15)
Here, I used the relationship sj = (1 − zj)fj + zjhj with zj = 1. Households will only
prefer owning to renting if r+δh < i. It is important to notice that this condition is necessary,
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but not sufficient to guarantee homeownership. This is because owner-occupied housing is
associated with additional costs in the model, such as transaction costs and indivisibilities.6
The condition r + δh < i can be motivated by assuming that rental housing depreciates
at a different rate the owner-occupied housing. In this world, the equilibrium price per rental
unit would be i = r + δf where δf is the depreciation rate of rental housing.7 Starting
with Henderson and Ioannides (1983), part of the literature has assumed that rental housing
depreciates at a higher rate compared to owner-occupied housing, δh < δf (see, among others,
Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2006), Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2008), Chambers et al. (2007)).8
This can be motivated with moral hazard issues, as renters may be less concerned about the
maintenance of the housing units than homeowners.
Renting households choose the number of housing units that equalizes the intra-period
marginal utility from housing to their intra-period marginal utility from non-durable con-
sumption.
∂U(cj , fj)
∂cj
∣∣∣∣
zj=0
(r + δf ) =
∂U(cj , fj)
∂fj
∣∣∣∣
zj=0
(2.16)
In the following, I will assume that δf is such that owner-occupied housing is preferred to
renting.
2.4.5 Precautionary Savings and Housing
In this section, I argue that introducing housing as an asset increase the demand for precau-
tionary saving compared to the one-asset economy with renting. This is due to the fact that
housing serves a dual role as a consumption good and as an investment good. I show that
this increases the volatility of aggregate consumption and therefore leads to more demand for
precautionary saving.
For simplicity, I abstract from down payment constraints and transaction costs.
Assumption 2 Call total household consumption g(c, h) or g(c, s), respectively. Let g′(c, h) >
0, g′′(c, h) < 0 and gch > 0 and ghc > 0.
Assumption 3 Households’ utility is given by U(g(c, h)) with U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and U ′′′ > 0,
i.e. households are prudent.
6On the other hand, it is also associated with benefits, since it serves as a collateral for financial debt.
7To see this, consider that rental housing is provided by a financial intermediary, which receives deposits
from the household sector, issues loans to the households and rents capital to firms. Profit maximization and
zero profits in equilibrium implies that is = r + δf (Gervais (2002)). This shows that owning can be strictly
preferred to renting even in a general equilibrium setting.
8Kiyotaki et al. (2007) present an alternative way to make owner-occupied housing preferred to renting:
they assume that households owner-occupied housing yields higher utility.
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Assumption 4 Period j′s earnings are given by yj = yj + y˜j where var() = σ2 . Without
loss of generality, I assume that y˜j either equals − or  with probability 0.5 each. Let || > 0
Now compare the maximal attainable aggregate consumption level in the one-asset econ-
omy with renting and in the benchmark case.
Definition 4 Let gj(u, h)∗ be the aggregate consumption level that solves 2.5, given 2.6 in
period j. Similarly, let gj(u, s)∗∗ be the aggregate consumption level that solves 2.7, given 2.8
in period j.
Lemma 5 Given definition 4 and assumption 4, it follows that gj(u, h)∗ ≤ gj(u, h)∗∗.
Proof. When housing is an asset, households choose their optimal amount of housing at
age j such that Ej(Uh(cj+1,hj+1))Ej(Uc(cj+1,hj+1)) = r + δh, while the optimal condition for renting is given by
Us(cj+1,sj+1)
Uc(cj+1,sj+1)
= r + δh. That is, they are equal in expectations:
Ej(Uh(cj+1,hj+1))
Ej(Uc(cj+1,hj+1))
= Us(cj+1,sj+1)Uc(cj+1,sj+1)
However, Uh(cj+1,hj+1)Uc(cj+1,hj+1) =
Us(cj+1,sj+1)
Uc(cj+1,sj+1)
iff  = 0, which contradicts the assumptions.
From this we get that:
Proposition 6 Assume that δh and r are equal to zero. Introducing housing as an asset
increases the amount of precautionary saving, for a given variance of earnings process.
Proof. When housing serves as an asset, savings are determined implicitly from the Euler
equation:
βEj(Uh(g(cj+1, hj+1))gh(cj+1, hj+1))+βEj(Uc(g(cj+1, hj+1))gc(cj+1, hj+1)) = Uc(g(cj , hj))gc(cj , hj)
(2.17)
Without housing as an asset, the Euler equation is given as:
βEj(Uc(g(cj+1, sj+1))gc(cj+1, sj+1)) = Uc(g(cj , sj))gc(cj , sj) (2.18)
Savings will be larger if the l.h.s. of 2.17 exceeds the l.h.s. of 2.18. Since the first term of
2.17 is positive given assumptions 3 and 2, it is sufficient to show that
Ej(Uc(g(cj+1, hj+1))gc(cj+1, hj+1)) > Ej(Uc(g(cj+1, sj+1))gc(cj+1, sj+1)) (2.19)
The optimal solution has to satisfy
Ej(Uc(g∗(cj+1, hj+1))g∗c (cj+1, hj+1)) > Ej(Uc(g
∗∗(cj+1, sj+1))g∗∗c (cj+1, sj+1)) (2.20)
From lemma 5 and assumption 3, Uc(g∗(cj+1, hj+1)) ≥ Uc(g∗∗(cj+1, sj+1)) for all realizations
of , for some Uc(g∗(cj+1, hj+1)) > Uc(g∗∗(cj+1, sj+1)). Therefore, Ej(Uc(g∗(cj+1, hj+1) >
Ej(Uc(g∗∗(cj+1, sj+1))).
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Now, distinguish two possible cases that may appear at different realizations of : (i)
g∗c (cj+1, hj+1) ≥ g∗∗c (cj+1, sj+1) and (ii) g∗c (cj+1, hj+1) < g∗∗c (cj+1, sj+1).
If (i), condition 2.19 is fulfilled, because of concavity of U .
In order to analyze case (ii), I define ∆ = g∗∗(cj+1, sj+1) − g∗(cj+1, hj+1) and ∆c =
g∗∗c (cj+1, sj+1)−g∗c (cj+1, hj+1). By concavity of U , condition 2.19 is fulfilled if ∆ ≥ ∆c. From
lemma 5, ∆ > 0 if ∆c > 0. Notice that by definition, g∗∗(cj+1, sj+1) =
∫ s∗∗
0
∫ c∗∗
0 g
∗∗
c (cj+1, sj+1)dcds
and g∗(cj+1, hj+1) =
∫ h∗
0
∫ c∗
0 g
∗
c (cj+1, hj+1)dcdh. Hence, ∆ > ∆c if ∆ > 0.
Remark 7 The amount of additional precautionary saving is decreasing in both δh and r
Thus, the dual role of housing as an asset and as a consumption good results in higher
precautionary saving compared to a standard model where housing as an asset is absent.
It is important to notice that the assumptions made about the functional form of both g
and U are quite general; for example, a large part of the literature assumes that aggregate
consumption is computed using a Cobb-Douglas functional form with constant returns to
scale (see Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) or Yang (2006) and the references cited
therein). These authors also assume that homeowners decide upon their housing stock one
period before the actual consumption takes place.
The rise in precautionary saving does not depend on the illiquidity of housing caused
by transaction costs, which studied in Grossman and Laroque (1990), Martin and Gruber
(2004), Flavin and Nakagawa (2004) and most recently, Stokey (2007). As argued by Martin
and Gruber (2004), the illiquidity of housing may either increase or reduce precautionary
saving.
In the present model, the impact of housing on precautionary saving arises simply be-
cause homeowners are forced to decide upon their housing consumption one period before.
Proposition 6 thus embodies an important contribution to this literature.
2.5 Parametrization and Calibration
In this section, I describe the parametrization of the utility function and the calibration of
all model parameters. I focus on two education groups, namely college graduates and high
school dropouts. This is because the wealth-income gap between these groups is the most
pronounced (see section 2.2). Restricting the attention to two education groups also greatly
helps to reduce computation time.9
9In addition, there is a clear-cut distinction between high school dropouts and college graduates when
calibrating the earnings process. When comparing high school graduates and college graduates, the treatment
of households whose head attended college but did not graduate is not clear.
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2.5.1 Preferences
I assume that preferences are identical for the different education groups. Period utility
function is assumed to be of CRRA type:
u(c, s) =
(g(c, s))1−θ
1− θ
where g(., .) is an aggregator function of the service flows from housing and the composite
consumption. I choose an aggregator of the CES type
g(c, s) = [φc−γ + (1− φ)s−γ ]− 1γ (2.21)
The elasticity of substitution between nondurable consumption and housing is thus given by
$ = 11+γ . If −1 < γ < 0, housing and nondurable consumption are substitutes with $ > 1.
If 0 < γ <∞, the two goods are complements and $ < 1. As γ approaches 0, we are in the
Cobb-Douglas case.
Together with the optimality condition (2.16), this implies that the optimal level of housing
services for renters is given by
s =
(
φ
1− φ
) 1
−γ−1
c
Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2007) provide evidence from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial
Census of Housing that the expenditure share on housing is constant over time and across
U.S. metropolitan areas. They conclude that households have Cobb-Douglas preferences
for housing and numeraire consumption. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) review
the empirical micro literature that provides estimates for γ and they find that most of the
estimates presented are not significantly different from zero. Consequently, they compute
aggregate consumption using a Cobb-Douglas form (also see Yang (2006) and many others).
I follow their example and use a Cobb-Douglas specification as well.
Under this specification, φ is the share of non-housing consumption in total utility. This
implies that φ is the total share of non-housing consumption in total expenditures.10 I set φ
equal to 0.7.
For the coefficient of relative risk aversion, θ, I use value of 1.5, which is taken from
Attanasio (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who estimate it from consumption data.
It is also well in the range of 1 to 3, which is commonly used in the literature.
The aim of my paper is to evaluate to what extend the model can account for the wealth-
income gradient. To this extend, I calibrate the discount factor β such that my model repli-
cates the wealth-income ratio for college graduates, which is observed in the U.S., taking all
other parameters as given. Since the same value of β is also used for high school dropouts,
10This holds in a world without imperfections.
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any gap in the wealth-to-income ratio must be endogenously generated by the mechanics of
the model.
2.5.2 Earnings Process
I assume that the process that governs the productivity shocks ηj,e follows an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ρhs for high school dropouts and ρcol for college graduates. The
variance of the innovations are σhs and σcol, respectively.
I follow Hubbard et al. (1995) (HSZ in the following) when calibrating the uncertainty of
the earnings process. As HSZ, I am primarily interested in uninsured risk, that is, risk faced
by households conditional on existing insurance coverage. HSZ thus include unemployment
insurance and use the combined labor income of the husband and wife (if married) as their
measure of ”earnings”.
Examing the 1982 to 1986 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), HSZ find that high
school dropouts have a higher variance (ρhs = 0.955, σhs = 0.033) compared to college
graduates (ρcol = 0.955, σcol = 0.016). It should be noted that both estimates are rather
conservative as HSZ use the combined labor income of the husband and wife (if married)
plus unemployment insurance for their estimates. I approximate the earnings process with a
eight-state Markov process using the procedure proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
I also take the average age-efficiency profile εej from HSZ. The authors find that earnings
are more peaked for college families, which is in line with findings from other empirical studies.
Figure 2.2 depicts the earnings profiles for high school dropouts and college graduates.
2.5.3 Housing Technology
I assume that the depreciation rate of owner-occupied housing is δh = 0.08. This value is
taken from Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) who use data from 2000 comprehensive
revision of NIPA and Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis to match investment shares of output and capital-output ratios.11
The depreciation rate of rental housing δf and the minimum housing size h are picked
jointly to match the share of homeowners of high school dropouts (50 percent) and college
graduates (87 percent) found in the 1989 SCF. This results in δf = 0.095 and h = 0.5.
The interest rate for financial assets is set exogenously to r = 0.045.
2.5.4 Market Imperfections
Martin (2003) estimates that the transaction costs of buying a new home are between 7 and
11 percent of the home value. This figure comprises agent fees, transfer fees, appraisal and
inspection fees. Martin and Gruber (2004) find that the costs for selling property are in the
11Note that their investment shares also include consumer durables other than housing.
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same range. I take a conservative choice with a value of 7.5 for both the costs of buying and
selling.
Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) estimate the average equity share for mortgage loans
using the 1983, the 1995 and 2001 SCF. They find that at the beginning of the 1980’s, shortly
after financial liberalization took place, the average equity share was approximately 0.23. It
declined to 0.1756 in 1995 and 0.1749 in 2001. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) conclude that
the reform of the household credit market was largely completed in 1995.
For the calibration of the down-payment value ζ, I take an average of the 0.23 and 0.17
and set ζ = 0.2, which is the parameter value commonly used in the housing literature (see
e.g. Gervais (2002) or Yang (2006)).
2.5.5 Welfare System
The consumption floor is measured to be 7000 US-Dollars (Hubbard et al. (1995)). This
corresponds to c = 0.20 in my economy if I express the consumption floor measured by
Hubbard et al. (1995) in units of the average labor earnings of a high school dropout.
Hubbard et al. (1995) also estimate that the elderly and the non-elderly receive the same
consumption floor. I thus set the annual retirement benefits pen to 0.20, which would cor-
respond to a replacement rate of about 45 percent of the average income in the economy. A
similar value of the replacement rate is also used in the related papers of De Nardi (2004)
and Yang (2006).
2.6 Results
I find that model fully accounts for the wealth-income gap between the median college gradu-
ate and the median high school dropout observable in the data. This can be seen by comparing
columns 1 and 2 of table 2.3. In fact, the model generates a wealth-income gradient with
educational attainment that is even steeper than the one that is observable in the data.
This stems from the fact that the wealth-income ratio for high school dropouts is smaller
in the model than in the data (1.6 instead of 2). By calibration, the model reproduces the
wealth-income ratio for college graduates that is observable in the data.
Given the success of the benchmark economy, it is interesting to assess the importance of
housing in generating inequality across income groups. I thus eliminate housing as an asset
and re-compute the wealth-income ratios for the two different education groups, keeping all
other parameter values fixed to their benchmark values. In this one-asset economy, households
can accumulate wealth only in form of bonds. The economy is thus similar to the models
presented the seminal papers of Huggett (1996) or Huggett and Ventura (2000).
Comparing columns 2 and 3 of table 2.3 reveals that removing housing reduces the wealth-
income gap generated by the model from 2.4 to 2. Interestingly, the decline stems only from
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the decrease in the wealth-income ratio of college graduates, while the wealth-income ratio
of high school dropouts remains unchanged. This suggests that introducing housing into the
standard life cycle framework primarily affects retirement savings of the income-rich.
Wealth Holdings of Renters and Homeowners
The model is also able to replicate another prominent pattern observable in the data, namely
the fact that wealth holdings near retirement vary widely with the ownership status. In line
with the data, I find that the gradient between homeowners and renters is more pronounced
for high school dropouts (the second and the third panel of table 2.3. Around 50 percent of all
high school dropouts rent their housing services between the age of 51 and 61, which implies
that the median household among the high school dropouts is a renter as well. Since the share
of homeowners is considerably larger (in the model: about 99 percent), the median household
with college education is a homeowner. If housing drives a wedge between the wealth holdings
of renters and homeowners, it may also contribute to the wealth-income gradient observable
between education groups.
Notice, however, that homeowners must be richer than renters by construction: owner-
occupied housing is preferred to renting, therefore only the unfortunate with a sequence of
bad earnings shocks will remain renters. These are also the ones with low wealth-income
ratios near retirement.
The Role of Social Security Benefits
In this context, it is also interesting to take a closer look at the role of social security
benefits. In the model as well as in the U.S., retirement benefits are not proportional to
social security taxes paid. Thus, retirement benefits make up a small fraction of earnings for
high earners and a high fraction of the earnings of low earners. Consequently, high earner
save at a higher rate before retirement than low-earnings. Huggett and Ventura (2000) find
that this feature of the social security system is capable of generating differences in savings
rates within age groups. Hendricks (2007) argues that implementing social security benefits
may generate a wealth-income gap between lifetime income groups that is even larger than
the observable gap in the data.
In order to measure the relative contribution of social security in my benchmark economy
with housing, I set rep = 0, which implies that there are no retirement benefits at all. Thus,
the only way households can survive during retirement is by accumulating wealth during
working life and by living off this wealth during retirement. The computational experiment
shows that setting rep = 0 reduces the gap between the income-rich and the income-poor: the
wealth-income ratio of high school dropouts doubles and increases from 1.6 to 3.3, whereas
the wealth-income ratio of college graduates increases only mildly from 4 to 4.8 (column four).
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This shows that retirement benefits indeed have an important impact on the wealth holdings
of the income-poor. However, social security can only partly account for the wealth holdings
of the poor: even after the removal of the social security system, the wealth-income gap still
amounts to 1.5.
Removing housing in addition to social security reduces the wealth-income gap generated
by the model even further, from 1.5 to 1 (column five). This shows that housing has an
impact on the wealth-income gradient, independently of social security. Again, removing
housing mainly affects retirement savings of college graduates. This suggests that housing is
essential for explaining the wealth holdings of the income-rich, while social security helps to
account for the low wealth holdings of the income-poor.
In essence, these experiments show that introducing housing raises the wealth-income gap
by about 25 percent, which is substantial. In the next section, I will shed more light on the
precise mechanisms that make income-rich households hold more wealth in the presence of
housing as an asset.
As an important contribution to the literature, my results show that a standard life
cycle model that is augmented by housing can generate a wealth-income gradient that is
in line with empirical evidence. The model is standard in the sense that preferences are
homogenous and individuals are fully rational. Cagetti (2003) and Hendricks (2007) find
that the heterogeneity in wealth-to-income ratios can be explained by heterogeneity in time
preference rates. Bernheim et al. (2001) argue that that ’rules of thumb’ or other less than
fully rational decision processes, including behavioral rules, are more consistent with the
observed heterogeneity (also see Dynan et al. (2004)). Guner and Knowles (2007) highlight
the role of marital instability in explaining wealth heterogeneity near retirement age. Scholz
and Seshadri (2006) emphasize the importance of children for household wealth, while Yang
(2005) finds that intergenerational links in terms of bequests are significant. The results in this
paper suggests that housing might play an important role for explaining wealth heterogeneity
across income groups.
2.7 Decomposition: Housing and Wealth Holdings Near Re-
tirement Age
In this section, I decompose the total impact of housing on generating wealth heterogeneity
across education groups. Three mechanisms are important. The first mechanism increases the
wealth-income ratio of college graduates because their hump-shaped earnings profile interacts
with the multiple role of housing as an asset, as consumption good and as collateral. For
the second mechanism, the presence of uninsurable mortality risk is important. I show that
uninsurable mortality risk further raise the gap between college graduates and high school
dropouts. And third, as shown theoretically in section 2.4.5, the dual role of housing as an
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asset and as a consumption good increases the demand for precautionary saving.
2.7.1 The Role of Consumption Smoothing
College graduates and high school dropouts do not only differ in the level of their earnings,
but also in the shape of their life cycle earnings profile. Figure 2.2 shows that earnings of
college graduates depict a pronounced hump with a peak around age 47, while the earnings
profile of high school dropouts is relatively flat.
The impact of this difference on pre-retirement wealth holdings is illustrated in figures 2.3
- 2.6. Here, I plot the life cycle wealth profiles for total wealth, distinguishing an economy
with and without housing.12 To isolate the impact of the life cycle earnings profile, I abstract
from earnings uncertainty and mortality risk when computing the graphs.
Strikingly, the graphs for high school dropouts coincide, independently of the presence of
housing. However, for college graduates, there is a marked difference in the pre-retirement
wealth holdings, depending on whether I consider the one-asset economy or the benchmark
model with housing.
The impact of housing can also be seen from the life cycle profiles of total (aggregate) con-
sumption. Total consumption is computed according to the consumption aggregator (equation
2.21).13 Figures 2.8-2.9 illustrate how households distribute their aggregate consumption over
the life cycle. In the economy without housing, total consumption of college graduates is con-
siderably more hump-shaped. However, there is no difference between the consumption profile
in the economy with housing and without housing for high school dropouts.
The impact housing has on the wealth and the consumption profile of college graduates
results from its dual role as a consumption good and collateral for financial loans. Because
the earnings profile of college graduates follows a pronounced hump-shape, college gradu-
ates accumulate housing capital by issuing financial loans early in life. This increases their
total consumption early in life when earnings are low. As a result, their overall life cycle
consumption profile becomes smoother.
Put differently, without housing, borrowing constraints are more binding at the beginning
of the life cycle, consumption follows income more closely, which results in lower pre-retirement
wealth holdings, because hum-shaped consumption profiles results in less resources during
retirement, when income is low. Binding borrowing constraints are often mentioned as a
reason for the hump in consumption expenditures, which are observable in the data (see
Browning and Crossley (2001) for an overview over the literature).
It is important to notice that the predictions of the model are in line with empirical ev-
12Proposition 2 states that the one-asset economies with and without renting are identical in terms of the
resulting life cycle profile of wealth.
13By assumption, it is aggregate consumption that households value in their utility maximization problem.
Households use wealth to distribute their aggregate consumption in such a way over the life cycle that their
total utility is maximized.
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idence derived from micro data. First, Attanasio (1999), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2004) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) all find that consumption profiles for
households with higher education level are more hump-shaped. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2004) further distinguish between durable (mainly housing) and non-durable con-
sumption. They point out that household’s non-durable expenditures are more hump-shaped
for individuals with higher education level, whereas durable expenditures are fairly stable
over the life cycle, independent of the education level. Yang (2008) obtains similar results.14
Second, Dynan and Kohn (2007) document that household debt relative to income is increas-
ing with the education level. This hints to the fact that households with higher education
accumulate more debt in order to obtain a smooth consumption profile.
To illustrate how the different shape of the earnings profile leads to a gradient in the
wealth-income ratio with educational attainment, I compute the wealth-income ratios that
correspond to figures 2.3 - 2.6. The results are shown in columns one and two of table 2.4.
Housing raises the wealth-income gap between college and high school dropouts by about
0.25.15
So far, I have studied the impact of housing in the absence of mortality risk. In the
next section, I show that introducing mortality risk amplifies the impact of housing on the
difference in the wealth holdings between the education groups even further.
2.7.2 The Influence of Mortality Risk
Introducing mortality risk reduces wealth holdings near retirement for both education groups,
independently of whether I consider the economy with or without housing. This can be seen
from comparing the life cycle wealth profiles that are presented in figures 2.11 - 2.14 to the
ones from the previous section (figures 2.3 - 2.6). In both cases, I abstract from earnings
uncertainty.
Intuitively, the reduction in total wealth holdings when introducing mortality risk makes
sense: the presence of mortality risk reduces the subjective discount factor, as individuals
face a positive probability of not surviving to enjoy the fruits of their savings, they discount
their future more heavily.16
Interestingly, the impact of mortality risk on pre-retirement wealth holdings is weaker
in the economy with housing. In order to understand why this is the case, recall from the
previous section that the interaction between the hump-shaped earnings profile of college
14Notice that consumption is not directly observable, only consumption expenditures.
15Notice that wealth-income ratios for high school dropouts in the economy with and without housing do
not coincide, even though their respective wealth holdings do. This is due to the definition of income, which
incorporates labor and capital income. Because households in the one-asset economy hold only financial assets
that bear interest, the income of the median household is higher in the one-asset economy, which explains why
the median wealth-income ratio is lower.
16See Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) for an excellent recent treatment of the consequences of uninsurable
mortality risk. Feigenbaum (2008) provides another excellent overview over the literature.
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graduates and the dual role of housing as a consumption good and collateral for financial
loans increased pre-retirement wealth holdings because borrowing constraints became less
tight at the beginning of the life cycle. Because mortality risk affects both college graduates
and high school dropouts, housing increases wealth holdings for both education groups.
The impact of mortality risk is quite similar: because mortality risk is increasing with
age, subjective discount factors are decreasing when individuals grow older. Consequently,
the presence of lifetime uncertainty raises the demand for consumption during working life,
which makes borrowing constraints more binding at the beginning of the life cycle. This is
when the collateral function of housing comes in handy: it allows households to increase their
consumption when needed. As a result, consumption tracks income less closely, which implies
that households accumulate more retirement wealth.
How housing and mortality risk interact in shaping the consumption profiles can be seen
in figures 2.16-2.17. As the graphs show, total life cycle consumption is much more hump-
shaped in the absence of housing. Recently, Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) and Feigenbaum
(2008) argue that mortality risk is an important for explaining the hump-shaped consumption
profile which is observable in the data. My paper contributes to this literature by pointing
out the importance of housing: if housing is considered in the analysis as well, the impact of
mortality risk on the shape of the aggregate consumption profile may be less pronounced.
2.7.3 The Role of Housing Market Imperfections
So far, I have abstracted from the existence of market imperfections related to housing, such
as down payment requirement and transaction costs. This allowed me to isolate the effect of
housing on pre-retirement wealth holdings. Introducing housing market imperfections makes
borrowing constraints more binding and reduces the scope of housing. Clearly, this has
negative consequences for wealth holdings near retirement, which can be seen from figures
2.19 and 2.20, where I plot the life cycle wealth profiles for the economy with housing and with
housing market frictions.17 Comparing these graphs to the figures in 2.11 and 2.14 reveals
that wealth holdings near retirement age decrease particularly strongly for college graduates.
This makes sense, as college graduates depend heavily on consumption smoothing, due to the
shape of the earnings process. The wealth-income ratios for the different economies confirm
this finding: the gap in the wealth-income ratio between college graduates and high school
dropouts is higher for the economy without housing market imperfections (table 2.4).
Hence, during a period of financial liberalization, when housing market imperfections be-
come less tight, we should observe an increase in the wealth-income gradient with educational
attainment. Interestingly, this is indeed the case. Sinai and Souleles (2007) document the
trends in the life-cycle profiles of net worth and housing equity over time using the 1983
through 2004 SCF. They find that wealth inequality with housing wealth has increased over
17Market imperfections are as outlined in calibration section.
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time.
In the next section, I will show that adding earnings uncertainty increases the wealth-
income ratio of college graduates even further.
2.7.4 Housing and Precautionary Savings
Earnings inequality and housing interact in generating inequality between college graduates
and high school dropouts. To see this, consider the different effects introducing earnings
uncertainty has in an economy with and without housing. In the economy with housing,
introducing earnings uncertainty raises the wealth-income ratio of college graduates, whereas
in the one-asset economy, earnings uncertainty decreases the wealth-income ratio for college
graduates. For high school dropouts, the effect is positive, independently of the presence of
housing. In total, the gap between the two education groups increases, when both housing
and earnings uncertainty are present.
These observations can be explained by the differences in earnings process. Recall from
the calibration section that the AR(1) process that governs idiosyncratic earnings risk has
the same (high) persistence parameter ρ = 0.955 for both high school dropouts and college
graduates. However, the standard errors of the innovations is much higher for high school
dropouts. This results in higher demand for precautionary saving for high school dropouts,
all other things equal.
In the housing model, the median high school dropout is a renter. By proposition 2, the
wealth holdings of renters are identical to wealth holdings of the one-asset economy. Conse-
quently, introducing earnings uncertainty increases wealth-income ratios in both economies,
and the median wealth-income ratio for high school dropouts coincides for both cases.
For college graduates, things are different. The high persistence of earnings shocks makes
borrowing constraints tighter for the median household. Thus, the consumption profile be-
comes more hump-shaped, and savings for retirement declines. In the housing economy, the
median college graduate is a homeowner. Therefore, wealth holdings will differ for college
graduates in one-asset economy with respect to the housing economy. In particular, we know
from proposition 6 that homeowners have a higher demand for precautionary saving for a given
level of earnings uncertainty. This works against the above effect and borrowing constraints
at the beginning of economic life are less tight. As a result, introducing earnings uncertainty
in the one-asset case reduces wealth holdings near retirement age, while it increases wealth
holdings in the housing case.
In essence, the interaction between life cycle effects and precautionary savings induced by
housing is able to generate a gap in the wealth-income ratio between college graduates and
high school dropouts that is consistent with the data.
The interaction of earnings uncertainty and life cycle effects on increasing wealth inequality
can also be seen from life cycle wealth profiles plotted in figures 2.21-2.26. Clearly, total
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wealth holdings are higher in the economy with housing, compared to the economy where
households can save only in bonds. If I remove market imperfections (i.e. I set ζ = 1 and
tc = 0), the difference between the housing economy and the one-asset case becomes even
more pronounced.
This finding contributes to the literature that looks at the impact of housing on household
wealth inequality in the U.S. (Martin and Gruber (2004), Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2006)). I
find that introducing housing can indeed raise wealth heterogeneity, due to the joint impact
of life cycle effects and precautionary savings. Both Martin and Gruber (2004) and Dı´az and
Luengo-Prado (2006) analyze the impact of housing in models with infinitely-lived households.
They conclude that housing and market imperfections related to housing contribute only very
little to explaining wealth heterogeneity. This points to the fact that life cycle effects for
understanding the role of housing.18
2.7.5 Market Imperfections and the Wealth-Income Gap between Home-
owners and Renters
Housing market imperfections matter for explaining another important dimension of the data.
As shown in the section 2.2, wealth-income ratios differ not only for households with differ-
ent education levels, but also for households with the same education group but different
homeownership status. In particular, the data shows that the wealth-income gradient with
educational attainment is less steep for homeowners than for the overall population. The
baseline economy reproduces this pattern fairly well (see column 2 of table 2.3).
Eliminating transaction costs and the down payment requirement raises the gap between
homeowners considerably. This is shown in table 2.4, column five. There are two mechanisms
at play. First, removing market imperfections increases the wealth holdings near retirement
for homeowners, because it facilitates consumption smoothing. This was shown in the previous
section. Second, without market imperfections, lower income households can get access to
housing.19
Because housing market frictions are not binding for college graduates (essentially every-
body owns a home in the pre-retirement stage), the first effect increases the wealth-income
ratio of this group. The opposite is true for high school dropouts: wealth holdings relative
to income decrease for the median homeowner with high school degree, because without fric-
tions, also poorer households can afford to buy a home. In total, the wealth-income gap
18Introducing transaction costs and down payment requirements to my model (as in the benchmark cali-
bration) decreases the impact of housing considerably. The lesson from this exercise is that the choice of the
benchmark case plays an important role for evaluating the impact of transaction costs on household’s savings
behavior. Choosing the standard one-asset model instead of the housing economy as a benchmark case may
seriously bias the estimated impact of transaction costs on wealth holdings upwards. Therefore, this paper
makes an important contribution to the literature that analyzes the consequences of the illiquidity of housing
wealth.
19Recall that owner-occupied housing is preferred. Therefore, only those households who cannot afford to
buy a home remain renters.
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between the homeowners of the two education groups more than doubles after the removal of
the constraints, and exceeds the observed value in the data by a big factor.
2.8 Conclusion
I analyze the determinants of the wealth-income gradient with educational attainment that
is observable in the data. This gradient is very steep: using the 1989 wave of the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), I find the median college graduates near retirement age holds
twice as much wealth as the median high school dropout. In this paper, I argue that housing
plays an important role for explaining the wealth-income gradient that is observable in the
data.
In order to shed more light on the role of housing, I set up a computable life cycle model.
Markets are incomplete, and household face idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Households receive
utility from the consumption of housing services and non-housing consumption. In total,
housing serves as a consumption good, asset and collateral for financial loans.
I show that a version of this model that is calibrated to match key features of the U.S.
economy can generate a wealth-income gap between the median of two education groups,
namely college graduates and high school dropouts, that is observable in the 1989 SCF.
Housing accounts for a substantial fraction of the observable wealth-income gap between the
two education groups: I find that a share of 25 percent of the total gap is due to the presence
of housing in the model. Strikingly, introducing housing raises the retirement savings of the
median college graduates.
This paper provides a natural framework for studying the impact of financial market
liberalization on the development of homeownership ratios and savings behavior along the life
cycle. I leave this extension for future research.
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Table 2.1: 1989 SCF: Median Wealth/Income for Different Education Groups
All Renters Homeowners Homeowners (>median)
No High-School 2 0.22 3.05 3.9
High-School 2.97 0.19 3.54 4.35
Some College 2.71 0.14 3.12 4.08
College Graduate 3.97 1.45 4.35 4.80
Notes: The data is weighted using the SCF sample weights.
2.9 Appendix: Graphs and Tables
Table 2.2: 2004 SCF: Median Net Worth
Homeowners Renters Owner-Renter Gap
No High School 100620 100 100500
High School 173400 3970 170000
Some College 258300 2220 256000
College 614200 46540 570000
Notes: The data is weighted using the SCF sample weights.
89
Winter, Christoph (2009), Altruism, Education and Inequality in the United States 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26812
Table 2.3: Median Wealth/Income for High School Dropouts and College Graduates, Aged
51-61
No Social One-Asset,no
Data Baseline One-Asset Security Social Security
Median Wealth/Income - Total Population
No High School 2 1.6 1.6 3.3 3.45
College Grad. 3.97 4.01 3.6 4.85 4.54
Median Wealth/Income - Renter
No High School 0.22 0.53 – – –
College Grad. 1.45 1.03 – – –
Median Wealth/Income - Homeowner
No High School 3.12 3.3 – – –
College Grad. 4.35 4.04 – – –
Notes: The column ’Data’ refers to the 1989 SCF. ’Baseline’: parameter values as outlined in the text. ’One-
Asset’: Only financial assets, no housing. ’No Social Security’: Baseline economy without retirement benefits
(rep=0). ’One-Asset Economy’: One-Asset Economy without retirement benefits.
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Table 2.4: Median Wealth/Income for High School Dropouts and College Graduates, Aged
51-61
One-Asset One-Asset Mort.Risk Baseline
No Uncert. No Uncert. Mort. Risk Mort. Risk Fric. No Fric.
Median Wealth/Income - Total Population
No High School 1.74 1.44 1.36 1.14 1.44 2.58
College Grad. 4.36 3.88 3.90 3.45 3.80 4.55
Median Wealth/Income - Renter
No High School – – – – – 1.21
College Grad. – – – – – –
Median Wealth/Income - Homeowner
No High School 1.74 – 1.36 – 1.44 2.58
College Grad. 4.36 – 3.90 – 3.80 4.55
Notes: ’No Uncertainty’: As in baseline, but no earnings uncertainty, no mortality risk and no trans.costs/down
payment req.. Notice that there is no heterogeneity and everybody is homeowner. ’One-Asset Economy, no
uncertainty’: No housing, no earnings uncertainty, no mortality risk. ’Mortality risk’: As before, but with
mortality risk.’One Asset, Mortality risk’: As before, but with mortality risk. ’Mortality risk, Frictions’:Housing,
no earnings uncertainty, mortality risk, housing market frictions, ’Baseline, no frictions’: Benchmark economy,
but no housing market frictions (trans.costs/down payment req.)
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Figure 2.1: 1989 SCF: Homeownership Rates for Different Education over the Life Cycle
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Figure 2.2: Normalized Life Cycle Earnings Profiles, from Hubbard et al. (1995)
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Figure 2.3: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without Housing,
College Graduates
Figure 2.4: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing,
College Graduates
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Figure 2.5: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without Housing,
High School Dropouts
Figure 2.6: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing,
High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.7: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without
Housing, College Graduates
Figure 2.8: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With
Housing, College Graduates
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Figure 2.9: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without
Housing, High School Dropouts
Figure 2.10: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With
Housing, High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.11: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without Housing,
College Graduates
Figure 2.12: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing,
College Graduates
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Figure 2.13: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without Housing,
High School Dropouts
Figure 2.14: Wealth Holdings Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing,
High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.15: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without
Housing, College Graduates
Figure 2.16: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With
Housing, College Graduates
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Figure 2.17: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and Without
Housing, High School Dropouts
Figure 2.18: Aggregate Consumption, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With
Housing, High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.19: Total Wealth, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing and
Housing Market Frictions, College Graduates
Figure 2.20: Total Wealth, Economy Without Earnings Uncertainty and With Housing and
Housing Market Frictions, High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.21: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. Baseline Economy,
College Graduates
Figure 2.22: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. Baseline Economy,
High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.23: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. One-Asset
Economy, College Graduates
Figure 2.24: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. One-Asset
Economy, High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.25: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. One-Asset
Economy, College Graduates
Figure 2.26: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. One-Asset
Economy, High School Dropouts
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Figure 2.27: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. Housing Economy,
No Frictions, College Graduates
Figure 2.28: Total Wealth for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th percentile. Housing Economy,
No Frictions, High School Dropouts
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Chapter 3
Parental Transfers and Parental
Income: Does the Future Matter
More Than the Present?
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I present a model of parental transfers that is based on the assumption of one
sided altruism. I use this model to study the link between parental expectations about their
future resources and their present transfer behavior. In the context of my model, I show that
parents who expect to receive more income in the future are willing to transfer more to their
offspring already today, all other things equal. The same is true for the degree of uncertainty:
parents who face less uncertainty about their future income are more willing to support their
children, because they have lower demand for precautionary saving, ceteris paribus.
I use data from the 1983 and the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to analyze
whether these theoretical predictions receive empirical support. Using the SCF has several
advantages: in the 1986 interview, households are asked detailed questions about the amount
of transfers they had given and received between 1983 and 1986. Moreover, households that
were interviewed in 1986 were already interviewed in 1983, which allows me to control for
their income and wealth before the transfer has taken place.
In line with the theoretical predictions, I find that households with higher education level
transfer more to their children, for a given level of their income and wealth in 1983. For this
exercise, I use the fact that in the data, better educated households have higher mean earnings
profile and lower uncertainty about their earnings than lower educated households (see, for
example, Hubbard et al. (1995)). The SCF provides information about parental support for
their offspring’s college education as well as information about financial transfers, which are
not tied towards college expenditures. Interestingly, I find that the impact of parental educa-
tion on total transfers is entirely driven by a strong relationship between parental education
and parental support for their children’s college education.
In order to shed more light on the role the parental future plays for explaining college
entry, I additionally use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men
(NLSY). The NLSY allows me to control for the ability of the children by using the test
results from the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Clearly, pre-college ability is an
important determinant of college enrolment and thus also for parental transfers for their
children’s college education.
I find that parental education has a significant impact on college enrolment, even after
controlling for the AFQT-scores. Previously, this has been interpreted as a sign that AFQT-
scores do not completely capture the complexity of pre-college abiliy. Therefore, parental
education and other variables that capture the long-term transmission of ability within the
family turn out to be significant (see Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). The theoretical results
in this paper complement this interpretation by showing that the impact of parental education
on college enrolment could at least partly be due to the brighter earnings prospects of better
educated parents.
The same picture arises if I control for future income, i.e. income that was received by the
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parents after the college decision had taken place. My results even suggest that the college
enrolment gaps with respect to future income are more pronounced than with respect to
current income.
In essence, I find that the observable transfer behavior is in line with the predictions
of one-sided altruism, in the sense that there appears to be a strong link between future
endowment and current parental transfer decisions. Interpreted in this way, the observable
college enrolment gaps with respect to family income suggest that borrowing constraints for
college education are quantitatively much more important than previously thought. This
result thus contributes to the literature that tries to assess whether borrowing constraints
are important for a significant fraction of the population (see Belley and Lochner (2007),
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) or Ellwood and Kane (2000),
among others).
3.2 Transfers in a Framework with One-Sided Altruism
Households in the economy consists of parents and children. In the model, parents live for
three periods. I assume that the utility of parents depends only on their offsprings’ first
period utility. Thus, I do not model the life cycle of children in greater detail. In each period,
parents are characterized by their current period income ypt and their assets a
p
t , which were
accumulated in the previous periods. We can think of the three periods as three different
stages of working life: young, middle-aged and pre-retirement. I assume that transfers take
place in the second period (middle-aged), which is consistent with empirical evidence. Gale
and Scholz (1994) find that the mean age of parents that give inter-vivos transfers is around
50. With an age gap of 30, children are around 20 when their parents turn 50, which is the
age when most children leave home and start their economic life, or invest in their college
education.
All households receive utility from their current-period consumption, which is denoted as
cpt . Because parents are altruistic, they also incorporate the utility of their children in their
maximization problem. Financial support from parents is denoted by tp. tp can take the form
of either direct transfers or human capital investment, e.g. investment in college education.
Gale and Scholz (1994) show that both kind of transfers are quantitatively very important
in the U.S. economy. For simplicity, I assume that parents decide only about the total sum
of transferred to their children and that transfers enter the budget constraint of the child
household linearly: cd = yd + tp. By doing so, I implicitly assume that there are no returns
to education and that there are no other inputs to the formation of human capital other than
parental transfers. Another important input often mentioned in the human capital literature
is (pre-college) ability of the child (see e.g. Becker and Tomes (1979) or Becker and Tomes
(1986) for a treatment of human capital theory).
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Abstracting from ability does not harm the main aim of this theoretical section; however,
ability will become important in the empirical section.1
Parents maximize their total lifetime utility which given by:
U = max
{
u(cp1) + βE[u(c
p
2)] + β
2E[u(cp3)] + λu(c
d)
}
(3.1)
such that
cp1 + a
p
1 = y
p
1
cp2 + a
p
2 + t
p = Eyp2 + (1 + r)a
p
1
cp3 = Ey
p
3 + (1 + r)a
p
2
cd = yd + tp
cpt , c
d ≥ 0
I assume that the utility function is the same for parents and their children. It is important
to notice that the above problem implies that altruism is one-sided, implying that parents
incorporate the utility of their children, but not the other way round. If altruism was two-
sided, parents and children would combine their resources and choose their consumption
path jointly, such that the utility of the overall family is maximized (see Laitner (1992)). A
case in which two-sided altruism could have a significant impact on the amount transferred
are human capital investments, like tuition fees for schools or colleges. These investments
typically enhance the future earnings prospects of the child, but require financial support
from the parents if credit markets to finance human capital investments are absent. With
two-sided altruism, parents know that their children will compensate them in the future, in
case the parents need it. With one-sided altruism, however, parents have no access to the
return generated by their investment. If they face bad earnings prospects, this lowers their
willingness to invest in their children’s education.
This intuition is formalized in the following two propositions.
Assumption 5 Assume that uc > 0, ucc < 0 and uccc > 0
1Giving more structure to the human capital production function would become important if one wanted
to study the relationship between financial transfers and human capital investment. See Brown et al. (2007)
for an interesting recent paper in this direction. Brown et al. (2007) distinguish two stages at which transfers
are given. First, parents invest in their children’s human capital. Later, in a second stage, parents decide on
financial transfers. Because the second decision is based on the economic performance of the kid, parents have
an incentive to invest more in human capital, on the expense of financial transfers.
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Assumption 6 Earnings in period j are given by yj = yj + y˜j where
y˜j =
{
−with prob. 0.5
with prob. 0.5
(3.2)
with 0 <  < yj and σ2y = 
2
Proposition 8 Let cp
∗
2 (a
p
1, y
p
2 , y
d, Eyp3), a
p∗
2 (a
p
1, y
p
2 , y
d, Eyp3) and t
p∗(ap1, y
p
2 , y
d, Eyp3) be the op-
timal level of consumption, savings and transfers are the solution to the parental problem 3.1,
given ap1, y
d, Eyp3 and y
p
2. Then, if assumption 5 holds,
dtp
∗
dEyp3
> 0, dc
p∗
2
dEyp3
> 0 and da
p∗
2
dEyp3
< 0
Proof. Suppose not and dt
p∗
dEyp3
< 0, dc
p∗
2
dEyp3
< 0 and da
p∗
2
dEyp3
> 0. Now consider Eyp
3′
> Eyp3 .
Let cp
∗∗
2 , a
p∗∗
2 and t
p∗∗ the optimal solutions to problem 3.1, given Eyp
3′
. Then, cp
∗∗
2 < c
p∗
2 ,
ap
∗∗
2 > a
p∗
2 and t
p∗∗ < tp
∗
. Optimality implies that
λu′(yd + tp
∗
) = (1 + r)βu′(Eyp3 + (1 + r)a
p∗
2 = u
′(cp
∗
2 )) (3.3)
λu′(yd + tp
∗∗
) = (1 + r)βu′(Eyp
3′
+ (1 + r)ap
∗∗
2 = u
′(cp
∗∗
2 )) (3.4)
Assumption 5 together with Eyp
3′
> Eyp3 and a
p∗∗
2 > a
p∗
2 implies that u
′(Eyp
3′
+ (1 + r)ap
∗∗
2 <
u′(Eyp3 + (1 + r)a
p∗
2 . However, c
p∗∗
2 < c
p∗
2 and t
p∗∗ < tp
∗
imply that u′(cp
∗∗
2 )) > u
′(cp
∗
2 )) and
u′(yd + tp∗∗) > u′(yd + tp∗), and the condition 3.4 cannot hold.
Proposition 9 An increase in parental earnings uncertainty reduces transfers to their chil-
dren: dt
p
dσ2y
< 0
Proof. Transfers in period 2 reduce savings and therefore consumption in the following
period. Thus,
cp3 = Ey
p
3 + (1 + r)(y
p
2 +−cp2 − tp) + (1 + r)(ap1)) (3.5)
Thus, the FOC for tp is given as follows:
(1 + r)βu′(Eyp3 + (1 + r)(y
p
2 + (1 + r)(a
p
1 − cp2 − tp)) = λpu′(yd + tp) (3.6)
Total differentiating with respect to  yields
λpu′′(yd+tp)
dtp
d
=
1
2
[u′′(y3++(1+r)a
p
2)(−
dtp
d
+1)+u′′(y3−+(1+r)ap2)(−
dtp
d
−1))] (3.7)
and thus
dtp
d
=
1
2u
′′(y3 + + (1 + r)a
p
2)− u′′(y3 − + (1 + r)ap2)
λpu′′(yd + tp) + 12u
′′(y3 + + (1 + r)a
p
2) + u′′(yj − + (1 + r)ap2)
(3.8)
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The denominator of this expression is unambiguously negative (because of concavity of u, see
assumption 5), while the nominator is positive if and only if
u′′(yj + + (1 + r)a
p
2)− u′′(yj − + (1 + r)ap2) (3.9)
is positive. For arbitrary  > 0, this is true if and only if uccc > 0 (prudence), which I assume
in Assumption (5).
3.3 SCF
I analyze the empirical relevance of propositions 8 and 9 with the help of the 1983 and the
1986 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF contains interviews from a
random sample of 3,824 U.S. households in 1983, along with a supplemental survey of 438
high-income households. In 1986, 2, 822 of these households were reinterviewed, including 359
in the high-income sample.
The SCF contains detailed data on wealth, income, demographic variables, and transfers.
In 1986, each household head was also asked if he or she contributed 3, 000 US-Dollar or more
to other households in 1983−85. If so, the amount given and the relationship of the recipient
household(s) to the respondent were elicited. Similar questions were asked about transfers
received from other households. Respondents were also asked separately to report any college
expenses they paid on behalf of children.
Gale and Scholz (1994) were among the first to use the SCF for the study of intra-family
transfers. Gale and Scholz (1994) also compare estimates of aggregate amount of transfers
from the SCF to other sources. They find that SCF estimates of educational expenses are
very similar to those reported by other sources. Estimates of financial transfers appear to be
somewhat lower, Gale and Scholz (1994) conjecture that this may be due to the censoring of
transfers at 3000 US-Dollar.
Gale and Scholz (1994) also provide detailed summary statistics on financial transfers and
education expenses reported in the SCF (see their tables 1 − 3, Gale and Scholz (1994) pp.
3 − 8. About 10 percent of all households gave 3000 Dollar or more to other households in
1983− 1985. The average transfer amount is around 16, 000 Dollars. Most transfers reported
are gifts from parents to their children (75 percent). Transfers for education are somewhat
more widespread: about 12 percent of the households that were interviewed in 1986 supported
their children’s college education in the last 3 years. The average amount was around 10, 000
Dollars. Givers are on average 55 years old (total sample: 48 years) and wealthier than the
sample average.
In the following, I restrict my analysis to households who provide a valid wealth observa-
tion in both years and whose household head is between 45 and 55 years old at the time of
the second interview. I also require that households have at least one child. Since the wealth
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distribution is very skewed in the U.S. (see Rodriguez et al. (2002) and the savings motives
of the very rich are not well understood, I further restrict my analysis to households at the
90th percentile or below in order to eliminate the super-rich.
3.3.1 Findings
Transfers: First, consider the total amount of inter-vivos transfers, which is given by the
sum of college expenses and all other financial transfers, not tied to college education. The
first column of table 3.1 reports the results of a Tobit model. The amount of total transfers is
treated as a left-censored variables with censoring-limit of zero. In line with the predictions
of the theoretical part, I find that transfers are increasing in the current level of income. If
we take parental education as a proxy for the earnings prospects, there is evidence that good
earnings prospects have a positive impact on transfers, all other things equal, as parents with
higher education level are willing to give more to their kids, given their income and their level
of wealth.
It is also interesting to analyze the two different components, namely college support and
financial transfers, separately. The second column of table 3.1 reports the results for parental
support for college education. Strikingly, the results are almost identical to those of the first
column, where I analyzed college support and financial transfers together. Consequently,
when I use only financial transfers as a dependent variable instead, I find that all estimated
coefficients are insignificant (third column of table 3.1).
This suggests that current and future parental income affect the amount of total transfers
given to the child mainly through educational expenditures. This suggests that educational
expenses by parents on behalf of their children can be very well explained by one-sided
altruism. I see this result as an important contribution to the literature that studies the
determinants of parental transfers (see Laitner (1997) for a comprehensive overview over this
strand of the literature, more recently, Brown et al. (2007) for a model that incorporates both
education and cash transfers.)2
Given that there appears to be a tight link between parental future income and their
willingness to provide college expenses, I will now shed further light on this issue. More
specifically, human capital theory predicts that parental investments in their children’s edu-
cation are also governed by their children’s ability, as children with higher ability presumably
have a higher expected return to education. College educated parents, in turn, can be ex-
pected have children with higher ability. If this is the case, this could explain why they also
invest more in the college education of their offspring, compared to lower educated parents.
2With respect to financial inter-vivos transfers, McGarry (1997) finds that the existence of estate tax
accounts for 30 percent of the total amount of inter-vivos transfers. That is, parents use inter-vivos transfers
in order to avoid estate taxes. In turn, this suggests that bequests and inter-vivos transfers should be studied
in the same framework. By definition, expectations about the parental future, which are studied in this paper,
cannot say anything about end-of-life bequests.
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In this case, it would be the ability of the children and not the better earnings prospects of
their parents that could explain why college educated parents transfer more to their children.
In order to evaluate the relative importance of ability and of parental earnings prospects,
I control for the intra-family transmission of ability. I do so by restricting my analysis to
families that have at least one child in college. I argue that this controls for the intra-family
transmission of ability: if one child has the ability to go to college, this should be true for
its siblings as well.3 I then analyze to what extend the total number of children is related to
expectations about future income. If the total number of children in college is independent
of the parental education level, I argue that expectations about future income do not matter
for determining the parental willingness to provide transfers, all other things equal. If not,
I interpret this as evidence for the fact that differences in the expectations about future
earnings matter. This is indeed the case, as table 3.2 shows. Here, I regress the number of
children that attend college between 1983 and 1986 on income, wealth and parental education
dummies and the total number of children. I find that college graduates that have at least
one child in college send significantly more additional children to college than high school
graduates or high school dropouts. Since all families in the sample have at least one child in
college, I argue that the intra-family transmission of ability is not important for explaining
why college graduates spend more for their children’s education. Instead, I take this result as
evidence that the better earnings prospects of college graduated parents allow them to invest
more in their children.
In the next section, I shed more light on the relationship by studying the NLSY which
allows me to measure the ability of children in a more direct way.
3.4 Expectations about Future Income and Enrolment Gaps
In the U.S., college education can be very costly, and a substantial part of the total college
expenses are paid by transfers coming from parents (Gale and Scholz (1994), Keane and
Wolpin (2001) and the references cited therein). Propositions 8 and 9 thus imply that parents
who expect less income in their future and who face a higher degree of uncertainty are
more reluctant to invest in their children’s human capital. In this section, I use the 1979
National Survey of Young Men (NLSY79) to shed more light on the relationship between
college enrolment and future parental income.
I find that there is indeed a positive relationship between college attendance and income
outlook: children of parents who expect more income in the future with less uncertainty
are more likely to attend college. This holds even after controlling for various other factors,
such as parental education, family background and distance from college. These factors are
sometimes also called ’long-term’ factors, while current income is viewed as a ’short-term
3This assumes that the intra-family transmission of pre-college ability is the same for all children, i.e.
parents do not discriminate when investing in pre-college education.
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factor’ (Carneiro and Heckman (2002)). The reason is that current parental income can
influence their ability to pay for their children’s education only in the current period, while
the long-term factors are supposed to capture all other factors that may generate a link
between family background and educational attainment.
I argue that many of these family background variables are also good predictors for future
income of parents. Therefore, the impact of family background variables may not only reflect
the influence of past events on college attainment of the offspring (e.g. parents with higher
education level investing more in their children’s early education, which also makes college
going more likely) but also their expectations about the future (e.g. parents with higher
education level investing more in their offspring’s higher education because they expect more
income in the future).
I view this as an important contribution to the debate about the extend to which financial
constraints for college education are binding (see, for example, Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
Carneiro and Heckman (2003) or Ellwood and Kane (2000)).
3.4.1 Data
The data are from the 1979 cohort of the NLSY. The NLSY consists of 12, 686 individuals,
approximately half of them male, who were between 14 and 21 age years old as of January
1, 1979. The sample contains a core random sample and oversamples of blacks, Hispanics
and ”disadvantaged” whites, and members of the military. Interviews were first conducted
in 1979 and have been conducted annually since then. This analysis is based on the white
males in the core sample who have a valid observation for the Armed Forces Qualification
Test (AFQT) in 1980 and a valid family income observation in 1979 or at age 17 (at the
latest in 1982). This leaves 2, 654 individuals for the analysis. The fact that the NLSY79
contains detailed information about the pre-academic ability of the respondents makes it a
very valuable survey for my purposes.
For each survey year, the NLSY79 provides a created variable entitled ”Total Net Family
Income”, which will be used as an income measure in this study. This variable is designed
to provide researchers with a summary variable of all the income received in the household.
The creation of the income variable differs among the years: in the survey years from 1979 to
1986, which were the early years when many of the NLSY79 respondents were younger and
living in the parental household, the interviews obtained income from all household members
related by blood or marriage. From 1987 onwards, only income from the respondents (and
not from their parents) was used to calculate the total net family income. Since I am only
interested in the relationship between parental income and college enrolment of their kids, I
disregard any data that is taken after 1986.
Schooling data is collected in the NLSY79 in event history form. It includes highest grade
attended and completed at each interview date, as well as dates and titles of degrees obtained.
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I measure college enrolment at age 21.
3.4.2 Results
College enrolment gaps with respect to current family income
I start with analyzing the link between current family income and college enrolment. With
the term current family income, I label the parental income that is measured in 1979 (or at
the age of 17), that is, approximately at the time when the college decision is taken.
Whether there is a link between college enrolment and current income has been the subject
of a heated debate in the literature (see Belley and Lochner (2007), Carneiro and Heckman
(2002), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) or Ellwood and Kane (2000), among others). The
main concern of this strand of the literature is to what extend college students are financially
constrained in their college decision. If number of college students with aﬄuent parents is sig-
nificantly higher, this is generally seen as a sign for the existence of some market imperfectness
that prevents students from poorer families to enrol in college.
Following the previous literature, I analyze to what extend there are differences in the
college enrolment rates between the different family income quartiles. Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) argue that students whose parents’ have income in the highest income quartile are
unlikely to be affected by financial frictions. Significant gaps in the enrolment rates between
students whose parents belong to different family income groups would be interpreted as a
sign for the importance of financial frictions.
Moreover, I compute enrolment gaps separately for different levels of pre-college ability.
This is necessary because families with higher income are more likely to have children with
higher pre-college ability, e.g. because of higher preferences for education, genetic transmission
or because they have more resources available for investment in early education. Human
capital theory predicts that children with higher ability have higher expected return from
college education, and are therefore more likely to enrol in college. I use the result of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a proxy for pre-college ability and compute the
enrolment gaps separately for different AFQT-terciles. The AFQT-results are a widely used
proxy for pre-college abiliy in the literature. See Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Belley
and Lochner (2007) for a discussion of the AFQT and for further references.
Even after controlling for pre-college ability, I observe that enrolment gaps with respect
to family income are substantial. This holds for all levels of pre-college abiliy, as well as for
students of 4-year colleges and 2-year colleges together (tables 3.3 and 3.4). This suggests that
family income plays an important role in determining college entry, which is frequently inter-
preted as evidence for the fact that borrowing constraints must be binding for a substantial
part of the population (Ellwood and Kane (2000)).
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The role of long-run factors
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that conditioning
on some measure of pre-college ability (such as AFQT) is not enough. They instead propose
to control for a host of other factors, such as parental education, family situation during
childhood, rural versus urban environment etc. in order to better account for pre-college
ability, which they call long-run factors as opposed to the current income, which they label
as a short-run factor.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that these vari-
ables are determinants of academic preparedness of a student. Their impact might have
occurred a long time ago in the past (therefore their name long-term factors). Hence, Be-
cause the current observation of family income is likely to be correlated with some of these
long-term factors as well, one would expect to find a weaker link between family income and
college enrolment.
This is indeed the case. Comparing tables 3.3 and 3.4 and 3.5 and 3.6 reveals that
enrolment gaps are much smaller, after these long-term factors are incorporated.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003) interpret this finding
as a sign that the long-term background has more weight in determining college entry, not
the current income situation at the time college entry takes place. They conclude that this
result suggests that borrowing constraints, which only affect the current budget available for
college investment, cannot be quantitatively important for a large share of the population.
With respect to strong impact parental education has on determining college entry, propo-
sitions 8 and 9 offer a different interpretation: they suggest that better educated parents ex-
pect more resources with a lower degree of uncertainty, and are thus more willing to support
their children’s college education.
In the next section, I provide more evidence for the importance of future resources in
determing college entry.
Future income and enrolment gaps
I now turn to the importance of future income. Propositions 8 and 9 suggest that not
only current income, but also expectations about future resources should have an impact
on enrolment gaps, if children depend on parental support in order to finance their college
education.
This is indeed the case. 3.7 and 3.8 show that college enrolment gaps with respect to
family income in 1986, the last year for which I have information about parental income,
are substantial. This is true for both students of all colleges and for students of 4-year
colleges only. Strikingly, once I incorporate future income into my regressions, the remaining
enrolment gaps with respect to current income vanish. This suggests that future income plays
an important role in determining college enrolment. In light of proposition 8, this hints to
the fact that parental support for college education matters, and that students whose parents
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have better income prospects receive better funding from their parents.
So far, I have implicitly assumed that parents have full information about their future
earnings. In reality, however, there may be some uncertainty about the future level of earnings.
Given their current characteristics, parents may form expectations about their income in the
future. Some characteristics may be more valuable for forecasting income than others. This
is suggested by the t-values that are displayed for the parental characteristics in table 3.9.
For example, college education of the father shows an outstanding strong impact on future
income. Hence, college educated fathers should face the lowest degree of uncertainty about
their future income prospects. According to proposition 9, college educated fathers should
thus be more prone to provide transfers to their children.
This is indeed the case. Despite the fact that income in 1986 is highly positively correlated
with the education level of the father, introducing future income increases the measured
impact of father’s education on college enrolment (compare tables 3.7 and 3.8 to tables 3.5
and 3.6). I interpret this as evidence for the empirical relevance of proposition 9.4
In summary, these findings suggest that there is a strong link between expected parental
resources and college enrolment of their children. This is in line with the predictions of the
theoretical model. In the model, the positive link between the future earnings and college
going arises because of one-sided altruism and borrowing constraints.5
In a companion paper, I develop a more structural framework which is based on the
assumption of one-sided altruistic parents and on imperfect capital markets. I use this model
as a measurement tool in order to evaluate to what extend borrowing constraints for college
enrolment are binding in the U.S. economy.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a model of parental transfers that is based on the assumption of one-
sided altruism. I use this model to analytically study the link between parental expectations
about their future resources and their present transfer behavior. In the context of my model,
I show that parents with a brighter earnings prospects are willing to transfer more to their
offspring already today, all other things equal.
I use data from the 1983 and the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to analyze
whether these theoretical predictions receive empirical support. In line with the theoretical
4Notice that the impact of mother’s education becomes weaker after future earnings are introduced, despite
the fact that mother’s education is only a bad predictor for future income (see table 3.9) and that there is a
strong influence of mother’s education on children’s cognitive achievement (see, for example, Carneiro et al.
(2007)). I interpret this as additional evidence for the fact that the strong impact of father’s education is
mainly because it signals lower uncertainty
5The model only analyzes the determinants of parental transfers in a general context and thus does not
mention borrowing constraints for college education explicitly. However, in order to get a link between parental
transfers and college enrolment, it is sufficient to assume that students cannot get funding from other sources
than their parents.
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predictions, I find that households whose head has a higher education level transfer more to
their children, for a given level of their income and wealth. If better educated individuals
have higher mean earnings profile and lower uncertainty about their earnings as suggested
by the empirical literature, this suggests that households with better earnings prospects do
indeed transfer more to their kids.
The chapter also makes an important contribution to the question whether borrowing
constraints for education are quantitatively important in determining access to college. Using
data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSY), I find that parental
education has a significant impact on college enrolment, even after controlling for measures
of pre-college ability such as AFQT-scores. According to my theoretical results, this suggests
that parental resources have strong impact on their children’s college decision, even if college
enrolment gaps with respect to current income are small. Thus, the true fraction of the
population that is adversely affected in their college decision by market imperfections may be
much higher than the small impact of current income suggests.
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3.6 Appendix: Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Tobit Regression, Various Forms of Parental Support, 1983 and 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances
(1) (2) (3)
Total Transfers College Ex. Fin. Transfers
Income (1983) 0.0634 0.0499 0.0520
(1.87) (1.75) (1.82)
Wealth (1983) 0.00111 0.000755 0.000616
(0.90) (0.82) (0.58)
high school 10001.1 10574.6 4792.0
(2.56) (2.40) (1.05)
college 20470.8 21695.2 6461.1
(4.30) (4.16) (1.19)
number of child. 389.2 318.7 617.9
(0.77) (0.59) (0.77)
Constant -19720.7 -21602.6 -35836.9
(-4.09) (-3.97) (-4.42)
Observations 453 453 453
t statistics in parentheses. All regressions use information of households with at least one
child, with household head that is between 45 and 55 years old, and with savings in the
lower 90th-percentile of the distribution.
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Table 3.2: Regression: Future Income and College Investment, SCF
Number of
Children in College
Number of child. 0.121
(4.53)
Income (1983) 0.000000637
(2.13)
Wealth (1983) -1.07e-08
(-1.32)
High School 0.245
(0.96)
College 0.461
(1.78)
Constant 1.449
(5.04)
Observations 136
t statistics in parentheses. All regressions use information of households
with at least one child, and of which the household head is between 45 and
55 years old.
Table 3.3: College Enrolment Gaps, 4-Year College, 1979 NLSY
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 1 - 4 -0.00726 -0.133 -0.297
(-0.42) (-3.64) (-5.35)
Income quartile 2 - 4 0.00758 -0.0887 -0.208
(0.42) (-2.64) (-4.71)
Income quartile 3 - 4 0.00243 -0.119 -0.156
(0.12) (-3.43) (-3.80)
Constant 0.0227 0.241 0.644
(1.44) (9.79) (24.04)
Observations 899 864 876
t statistics in parentheses. ’Income quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college
enrolment rate between children whose parental income is the first income quartile with
respect to children whose parents’ have income in the highest income quartile.
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Table 3.4: Regression College Enrolment Rates
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 1 - 4 -0.0259 -0.247 -0.235
(-1.00) (-5.86) (-4.34)
Income quartile 2 - 4 0.0189 -0.186 -0.192
(0.70) (-4.81) (-4.44)
Income quartile 3 - 4 -0.000214 -0.208 -0.146
(-0.01) (-5.23) (-3.64)
Constant 0.0568 0.394 0.731
(2.42) (13.93) (27.94)
Observations 899 864 876
t statistics in parentheses. ’Income quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college
enrolment rate between children whose parental income is the first income quartile with
respect to children whose parents’ are in the highest income quartile.
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Table 3.5: College Enrolment Gaps for Different AFQT-Scores, 1979 NLSY, 4-year college
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 1 - 4 0.00827 -0.0799 -0.126
(0.37) (-1.82) (-2.02)
Income quartile 2 - 4 0.0254 -0.0239 -0.104
(1.13) (-0.64) (-2.17)
Income quartile 3 - 4 0.00196 -0.0863 -0.0689
(0.09) (-2.38) (-1.62)
Highest grade comp., father -0.00158 0.00222 0.0190
(-0.67) (0.36) (2.02)
Highest grade comp., mother 0.00241 0.000877 0.00473
(0.98) (0.12) (0.44)
College, father 0.0868 0.120 0.0629
(2.28) (2.27) (1.02)
College, mother -0.0659 0.171 0.133
(-1.40) (2.60) (2.08)
Grew up in south -0.0206 -0.0266 0.0887
(-1.31) (-0.74) (1.71)
Intact family 0.0265 0.0355 0.0499
(1.91) (1.01) (1.06)
Number of siblings (1979) -0.00491 -0.00482 -0.0319
(-1.85) (-0.75) (-3.53)
Constant 0.00857 0.131 0.272
(0.22) (1.30) (1.72)
Observations 703 754 819
t statistics in parentheses. ’Income quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college enrolment
rate between children whose parental income is the first income quartile with respect to children
whose parents’ are in the highest income quartile.
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Table 3.6: College Enrolment Gaps for Different AFQT-Scores, 1979 NLSY, 2- and 4-year
colleges
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 4 - 1 -0.0158 -0.228 -0.0942
(-0.46) (-4.54) (-1.55)
Income quartile 4 - 2 0.0318 -0.137 -0.0978
(0.94) (-3.19) (-2.10)
Income quartile 4 - 3 -0.00552 -0.182 -0.0693
(-0.16) (-4.40) (-1.68)
highest grade comp., father -0.000360 -0.00100 0.0196
(-0.10) (-0.14) (2.16)
highest grade comp., mother -0.00262 -0.00868 0.00521
(-0.70) (-1.03) (0.50)
college, father 0.0999 0.203 0.0651
(1.73) (3.35) (1.09)
college, mother -0.0846 0.248 0.0626
(-1.19) (3.31) (1.01)
Grew up in south -0.0174 -0.0431 0.128
(-0.73) (-1.04) (2.55)
intact family 0.0298 -0.0000900 0.0183
(1.42) (-0.00) (0.40)
number of siblings(1979) -0.00811 -0.00916 -0.0324
(-2.02) (-1.25) (-3.69)
Constant 0.101 0.474 0.393
(1.67) (4.12) (2.57)
Observations 703 754 819
t statistics in parentheses. ’Income quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college enrolment
rate between children whose parental income is the first income quartile with respect to children
whose parents’ are in the highest income quartile.
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Table 3.7: College Enrolment Gaps for Different AFQT-Scores, 1979 NLSY, 4-year college
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 4 - 1 0.0340 -0.0503 -0.123
(1.12) (-1.00) (-1.82)
Income quartile 4 - 2 0.0516 0.0209 -0.0630
(1.76) (0.49) (-1.20)
Income quartile 4 - 3 0.0228 -0.0756 -0.0627
(0.77) (-1.87) (-1.36)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 1 0.000337 -0.0867 0.0183
(0.01) (-1.95) (0.36)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 2 -0.0120 -0.121 -0.114
(-0.47) (-2.99) (-2.23)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 3 0.0150 -0.0789 -0.0732
(0.59) (-1.98) (-1.57)
Highest grade compl., father -0.00273 0.00539 0.0253
(-0.90) (0.76) (2.43)
Highest grade compl., mother 0.00376 0.00453 0.00860
(1.15) (0.54) (0.74)
College, father 0.131 0.0743 0.0134
(2.63) (1.27) (0.20)
College, mother -0.0844 0.151 0.100
(-1.45) (2.10) (1.44)
Constant -0.0102 0.129 0.202
(-0.19) (1.10) (1.14)
Observations 525 614 695
t statistics in parentheses. I also control for south, intact family and number of siblings. ’Income
quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college enrolment rate between children whose
parental income is the first income quartile with respect to children whose parents’ are in the
highest income quartile.
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Table 3.8: College Enrolment Gaps for Different AFQT-Scores, 1979 NLSY, 2- and 4-year
colleges
AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile AFQT Tercile
1 2 3
Income quartile 4 - 1 0.0117 -0.196 -0.0790
(0.26) (-3.43) (-1.21)
Income quartile 4 - 2 0.0519 -0.0743 -0.0724
(1.20) (-1.54) (-1.43)
Income quartile 4 - 3 0.00191 -0.160 -0.0740
(0.04) (-3.49) (-1.67)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 1 -0.0456 -0.139 0.0284
(-1.24) (-2.75) (0.58)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 2 -0.0552 -0.112 -0.0739
(-1.47) (-2.44) (-1.50)
Income (1986) quartile 4 - 3 0.000224 -0.0993 -0.0733
(0.01) (-2.20) (-1.63)
Highest grade compl., father -0.00174 0.000938 0.0238
(-0.39) (0.12) (2.37)
Highest grade compl., mother -0.00356 -0.0103 0.00515
(-0.74) (-1.07) (0.46)
College, father 0.0930 0.180 0.0382
(1.28) (2.73) (0.59)
College, mother -0.0640 0.276 0.0516
(-0.75) (3.39) (0.77)
Constant 0.139 0.555 0.376
(1.79) (4.19) (2.20)
Observations 525 614 695
t statistics in parentheses. I also control for south, intact family and number of siblings. ’Income
quartile 1 - 4’ measures the difference in the college enrolment rate between children whose
parental income is the first income quartile with respect to children whose parents’ are in the
highest income quartile.
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Table 3.9: Family Income in 1986 and its Determinants,
(1)
Family Income 1986
college father 1391.3
(1.83)
Income 0.348
(18.81)
Father hs. dropout -2674.4
(-5.12)
Mother hs. dropout -2172.5
(-4.28)
Constant 14781.4
(26.90)
Observations 7563
t statistics in parentheses. Only significant regressors are reported.
130
Winter, Christoph (2009), Altruism, Education and Inequality in the United States 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26812
